Open-Source Security Intelligence

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.

Search

GHSA-c6q7-wqw2-h65w

MediumCVSS 4.8 / 10
Published Oct 30, 2026·Last modified Oct 30, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Maven logogov.nsa.emissary/emissary
< 8.51.0
Description

Summary

The URL validation regex ^(https?:/)?/.* added to emissary's NavAction.java allows protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/...) and single-slash scheme variants (http:/evil.com) to bypass validation, enabling SSRF and open redirect attacks.

Affected Package

  • Ecosystem: Maven
  • Package: NationalSecurityAgency/emissary
  • Affected versions: < e2078417464b
  • Patched versions: >= e2078417464b

Severity

Medium

CWE

CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Details

The fix in NavAction.java (line 47) introduces a VALID_LINK pattern:

Pattern.compile("^(https?:/)?/.*")

This regex is intended to restrict navigation links to relative paths and HTTP/HTTPS URLs. However, it has multiple bypass vectors.

Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/...): The group (https?:/)? is optional, so the pattern reduces to //.* when the group is absent. This matches //evil.com/steal?c=SESSION, which browsers resolve to the current page's protocol plus the attacker's host.

Single-slash scheme (http:/evil.com): The regex group captures http:/ as a valid match, and browsers normalize http:/evil.com to http://evil.com, creating an open redirect to the attacker's server.

Protocol-relative to cloud metadata (//169.254.169.254/...): This enables SSRF to cloud instance metadata endpoints, which is particularly dangerous in AWS/GCP environments where IAM credentials can be retrieved.

The pre-fix code had no validation at all, accepting any URL. The fix blocks javascript:, ftp:, and data: URIs, but the protocol-relative and single-slash bypasses remain exploitable.

PoC

"""
CVE-2026-35571 - NationalSecurityAgency/emissary SSRF via NavAction

The fix in commit e2078417464b adds URL scheme validation using:
    Pattern.compile("^(https?:/)?/.*")

This allows protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com) and single-slash variants
(http:/evil.com) to bypass the validation.

Tested against: emissary@0d4dc56 (pre-fix) and patch e207841
Extracted from: src/main/java/emissary/server/mvc/NavAction.java:47
"""

import re
import sys

FIXED_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^(https?:/)?/.*")


def vulnerable_accepts(link: str) -> bool:
    """Pre-fix behaviour: no validation, everything passes."""
    return True


def fixed_accepts(link: str) -> bool:
    """Post-fix behaviour: must match VALID_LINK pattern."""
    return bool(FIXED_PATTERN.match(link))


TEST_VECTORS = [
    ("javascript: XSS payload",
     "javascript:alert(document.cookie)", True),
    ("ftp: scheme",
     "ftp://evil.com/exfil", True),
    ("data: URI",
     "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>", True),

    ("Relative path",
     "/path/to/resource", False),
    ("HTTP URL",
     "http://trusted.internal:8080/api", False),
    ("HTTPS URL",
     "https://trusted.internal/api", False),

    ("Protocol-relative URL to attacker host (//evil.com)",
     "//evil.com/steal?c=SESSION", True),
    ("Protocol-relative with embedded credentials",
     "//user:pass@evil.com/path", True),
    ("Protocol-relative to cloud metadata (//169.254.169.254)",
     "//169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", True),
    ("Backslash trick (\\\\evil.com)",
     "\\\\evil.com/path", True),
    ("Tab in scheme (java\\tscript:...)",
     "java\tscript:alert(1)", True),
    ("Path starting with attacker-like host (/evil.com)",
     "/evil.com", False),
    ("Triple slash (///evil.com)",
     "///evil.com/etc/passwd", True),
    ("http:/ single-slash to attacker host",
     "http:/evil.com/steal", True),
    ("https:/ single-slash to attacker host",
     "https:/evil.com/steal", True),
    ("URL-encoded javascript scheme (%6a...)",
     "%6aavascript:alert(1)", True),
    ("CRLF injection in path",
     "/legit\r\nLocation: http://evil.com", True),
]


def main():
    print("=" * 72)
    print("CVE-2026-35571 -- Emissary NavAction SSRF / Open-Redirect PoC")
    print("Pattern under test: ^(https?:/)?/.*")
    print("=" * 72)
    print()

    bypasses_found = []
    results_table = []

    for desc, url, should_block in TEST_VECTORS:
        vuln_result = vulnerable_accepts(url)
        fixed_result = fixed_accepts(url)

        if should_block and fixed_result:
            status = "BYPASS"
            bypasses_found.append((desc, url))
        elif should_block and not fixed_result:
            status = "BLOCKED (good)"
        elif not should_block and fixed_result:
            status = "ALLOWED (good)"
        elif not should_block and not fixed_result:
            status = "FALSE-POS"
        else:
            status = "UNKNOWN"

        results_table.append((desc, url, vuln_result, fixed_result, status))

    for desc, url, vuln, fixed, status in results_table:
        display_url = repr(url) if len(url) > 50 else url
        print(f"[{status:>15}]  {desc}")
        print(f"{'':>17}  URL: {display_url}")
        print(f"{'':>17}  pre-fix={vuln}  post-fix={fixed}")
        print()

    print("=" * 72)
    print(f"Total vectors tested : {len(TEST_VECTORS)}")
    print(f"Bypasses found       : {len(bypasses_found)}")
    print()

    if bypasses_found:
        print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED -- the following vectors bypass the fix:")
        print()
        for desc, url in bypasses_found:
            print(f"  - {desc}")
            print(f"    URL: {repr(url)}")
        print()
        print("Key finding: The regex ^(https?:/)?/.* allows protocol-relative")
        print("URLs (//evil.com/...) because the optional group (https?:/) can be")
        print("absent, leaving //.* which matches //attacker.com. This enables")
        print("SSRF to arbitrary external hosts via navigation links.")
        print()
        print("Additionally, http:/evil.com and https:/evil.com match the regex")
        print("(group 1 captures 'http:/' or 'https:/') and browsers normalise")
        print("these to http://evil.com, enabling open redirect / SSRF.")
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        print("No bypasses found -- fix appears complete.")
        sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Run python3 poc.py
  2. Observe that protocol-relative and single-slash URLs bypass the regex

Expected output:

VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/) and single-slash variants (http:/evil.com) bypass the regex validation.

Impact

An attacker can craft navigation links that bypass URL validation to redirect users to attacker-controlled servers (open redirect) or make the emissary server issue requests to internal services (SSRF). The //169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ bypass is particularly dangerous in cloud environments, enabling retrieval of IAM credentials.

Suggested Remediation

Replace the regex with one that explicitly rejects protocol-relative URLs. Alternatively, parse the URL with java.net.URI and validate the scheme and host against an allowlist rather than relying on regex.

References

  • Incomplete fix commit: https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/commit/e2078417464b9004620dde28dcbca2f73ea06c13
  • Original CVE: CVE-2026-35571
Upload your SBOM

Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.

Risk Scores
Base Score
4.8

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
4.4

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.35%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Browse More

Scan your project

Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.

Checkout DevGuard