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GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg
No affected components available
Summary
Context.spawn() in liquidjs creates a child Context for the {% render %} tag but does not propagate the parent context's resolved ownPropertyOnly value. The new context re-derives ownPropertyOnly from opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), silently discarding any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override that was supplied to parseAndRender(). As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible ownPropertyOnly:false and then locks down an untrusted render with parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any {% render %} partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (where, reject, group_by, find, find_index, has) — the underlying root cause in Context.spawn() is shared, but {% render %} is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage.
Details
The bug is in Context.spawn():
// src/context/context.ts:105-114
public spawn (scope = {}) {
return new Context(scope, this.opts, {
sync: this.sync,
globals: this.globals,
strictVariables: this.strictVariables
// <-- ownPropertyOnly is missing here
}, {
renderLimit: this.renderLimit,
memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit
})
}
The constructor resolves ownPropertyOnly as:
// src/context/context.ts:47
this.ownPropertyOnly = renderOptions.ownPropertyOnly ?? opts.ownPropertyOnly
Because spawn() passes a RenderOptions object with no ownPropertyOnly, the child context falls back to opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), throwing away any per-render override that the parent context had applied. this.opts is the raw normalized instance options object; it is not mutated to reflect render-time overrides.
The {% render %} tag at src/tags/render.ts:51-77 calls spawn() to build the partial's isolated scope:
* render (ctx: Context, emitter: Emitter): Generator<unknown, void, unknown> {
const { liquid, hash } = this
const filepath = (yield renderFilePath(this['file'], ctx, liquid)) as string
assert(filepath, () => `illegal file path "${filepath}"`)
const childCtx = ctx.spawn() // <-- ownPropertyOnly lost here
const scope = childCtx.bottom()
__assign(scope, yield hash.render(ctx))
...
const templates = (yield liquid._parsePartialFile(filepath, childCtx.sync, this['currentFile'])) as Template[]
yield liquid.renderer.renderTemplates(templates, childCtx, emitter)
}
All template variable lookups inside the partial then go through childCtx.readProperty() (src/context/context.ts:123-135), which calls readJSProperty(obj, key, this.ownPropertyOnly). With childCtx.ownPropertyOnly === false (inherited from opts), the protective check at src/context/context.ts:138-141 is skipped and prototype-chain properties are returned to the template:
export function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) {
if (ownPropertyOnly && !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) && !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined
return obj[key]
}
The {% include %} tag is not affected: it does not call spawn(); it pushes onto the parent context's scope stack (src/tags/include.ts:40), so the parent's resolved ownPropertyOnly continues to apply.
Trust model / why this matters: RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly is documented (src/liquid-options.ts:108-111) as "Same as ownPropertyOnly on LiquidOptions, but only for current render() call". It exists precisely so that developers running a non-strict instance can lock down individual untrusted renders. That contract is broken — the override is silently dropped at every partial boundary.
PoC
mkdir -p /tmp/render-poc
printf '{{ user.passwordHash }}' > /tmp/render-poc/_user.liquid
node -e "
const { Liquid } = require('./dist/liquid.node.js');
const liquid = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: false, root: '/tmp/render-poc' });
class User { constructor(n){ this.name = n; } }
User.prototype.passwordHash = 'bcrypt\$secret';
const u = new User('alice');
liquid.parseAndRender(
'Direct:[{{ user.passwordHash }}] Render:[{% render \"_user.liquid\", user: user %}]',
{ user: u },
{ ownPropertyOnly: true }
).then(console.log);
"
Verified output on liquidjs 10.25.7:
Direct:[] Render:[bcrypt$secret]
The top-level expression {{ user.passwordHash }} is correctly blocked by the per-render ownPropertyOnly:true, but the same expression inside the partial loaded by {% render %} returns the prototype-chain property — proof that Context.spawn() discarded the override.
Impact
- Information disclosure: Any prototype-chain property of objects passed into a
{% render %}partial — including secrets, hashes, internal state, framework-injected helpers — becomes readable from inside the partial template, even when the developer used the documented per-render lockdown. - Realistic threat model: Applications that maintain
ownPropertyOnly:falsefor backwards compatibility (or because their data layer relies on prototype methods) and lock down untrusted-template renders withparseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly:true })are protected at the top level but silently exposed inside any partial. User-controllable template content (CMS snippets, theme partials, email templates) that uses{% render %}becomes an info-leak primitive. - Distinct from existing CVE-2022-25948: the prior advisory only covered direct use of
ownPropertyOnly:false; this is a failure of the documented mitigation (ownPropertyOnly:trueper-render override), not a missing setting. - Distinct from the array-filter variant: same
spawn()root cause, but exploitable without invokingwhere/reject/group_by/find/find_index/has— only requires that the template uses{% render %}(a basic templating feature) and that one of the rendered values has prototype-chain properties.
Recommended Fix
Propagate ownPropertyOnly (and any other security-relevant render options) inside Context.spawn():
// src/context/context.ts
public spawn (scope = {}) {
return new Context(scope, this.opts, {
sync: this.sync,
globals: this.globals,
strictVariables: this.strictVariables,
ownPropertyOnly: this.ownPropertyOnly // <-- propagate resolved per-render value
}, {
renderLimit: this.renderLimit,
memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit
})
}
Passing this.ownPropertyOnly (the resolved value, not this.opts.ownPropertyOnly) ensures any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override flows into spawned child contexts. This single change closes both the {% render %} pathway documented here and the array-filter pathway tracked separately. A regression test should assert that a partial rendered via {% render %} honours parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) against an object with prototype-chain properties.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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