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GHSA-9pg3-25fq-p6cc
No affected components available
internal/web/operators.go:251 — after handleOperatorCreateAPIKey mints a fresh 32-byte bearer token, the redirect points the operator's browser at:
/ui/operators/<id>?new_key=<raw-token>&key_name=<name>
The raw API key ends up:
- in the browser's URL history
- in the
Refererheader on every cross-origin asset the detail page loads (any third-party SVG/CSS/JS resource the layout pulls in) - in any reverse-proxy or load-balancer access log on the path (nginx default
combinedlog captures the query string) - in any structured log sink the operator's local browser-history backup tool ships out
Authorization: Bearer <token> headers go through the same hops without these problems because access logs typically don't capture request headers and the browser doesn't replay headers cross-origin.
Same handler also appends name (r.FormValue("name")) to the query string without url.QueryEscape, so an & in the operator-supplied key name corrupts query parsing and a \r\n in older proxies could split response headers.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.1.
Reproducer
As admin, create an API key via /ui/operators/<id>/api-keys (form POST). The 303 Location header carries the raw token in the query string. Open browser DevTools → Network → response headers; or check the reverse-proxy access log; or check the operator-detail page's Referer-emitting fetches.
Suggested fix
Stash the raw key in a one-shot server-side flash storage (e.g., a row in operator_sessions keyed by session token, with a one_shot_token column and consumed_at) or in a short-lived signed cookie. Render the key once inline on the detail page after the redirect, and clear the storage on render. Pattern mirrors the recovery-codes display in the TOTP flow.
If the flash-storage refactor is too invasive, the minimal fix is to render the key inline via a POST → 200 OK with HTML (no redirect), losing the post-redirect-get idiom but eliminating the URL exposure.
Also fix name query encoding with url.QueryEscape regardless of which fix shape lands.
CVSS estimate
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N — 5.5 (medium). AV:L because realistic exploit requires log-read access on shared infrastructure (proxy, CDN, browser-history backup) the operator's session touches.
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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