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GHSA-9f29-v6mm-pw6w
No affected components available
A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the input.parsed_path field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (//) as authority components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.
Attack example
HTTP request:
GET //admin/users HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Policy sees:
The leading //admin path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from input.parsed_path field:
{
"parsed_path": ["users"]
}
Backend receives:
//admin/users path, normalized to /admin/users.
Affected Request Pattern Examples
| Request path | input.parsed_path | input.attributes.request.http.path | Discrepancy |
| - | - | - | - |
| / | [""] | / | ✅ None |
| //foo | [""] | //foo| ❌ Mismatch |
| /admin | ["admin"] | /admin | ✅ None |
| /admin/users | ["admin", "users"] | /admin/users | ✅ None |
| //admin/users | ["users"] | //admin/users | ❌ Mismatch |
Impact
Users are impacted if all the following conditions apply:
- Protected resources are path-hierarchical (e.g.,
/admin/usersvs/users) - Authorization policies use
input.parsed_pathfor path-based decisions - Backend servers apply lenient path normalization
Patches
Go: v1.13.2-envoy-2
Docker: 1.13.2-envoy-2, 1.13.2-envoy-2-static
Workarounds
Users who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.
1. Enable the merge_slashes Envoy configuration option
As per Envoy best practices, enabling the merge_slashes configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the input.parsed_path issue described in this advisory.
2. Use input.attributes.request.http.path instead of input.parsed_path in policies
The input.attributes.request.http.path field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using input.parsed_path to instead use the input.attributes.request.http.path field.
Example
package example
# Use instead of input.parsed_path
parsed_path := split( # tokenize into array
trim_left( # drop leading slashes
urlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path
"/",
),
"/",
)
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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