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GHSA-96fh-m4r8-6v9v
No affected components available
Summary
A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the
testConnection endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in
a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace.
Details
The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in RootScopes.BYPASS scope and
checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an
owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped
to the integration's workspace by joining on fk_workspace_id, and the controller
rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace.
Impact
Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient.
Credit
This issue was reported by @DongyangLyu.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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