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GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh
No affected components available
Summary
OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (POST /tools/invoke) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:
- The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like
sessions_spawn/sessions_sendand pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions. - ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.
Impact
If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:
- Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.
- Perform cross-session message injection via
sessions_send. - In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H(8.8)
Affected versions
openclaw < 2026.2.14
Fixed in
openclaw >= 2026.2.14
Remediation
The default behavior is now hardened:
- PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP
/tools/invokeby default (withgateway.tools.{allow,deny}overrides) and harden ACP permission handling. - Commit
bb1c3dfe1: ACP clients now prompt for any non-read/search permission request (fail closed for mutating/execution/fetch operations). - Commit
539689a2f: security audit warns whengateway.tools.allowre-enables default-denied HTTP tools, since this can increase RCE blast radius if the Gateway is reachable. - Commit
153a7644e: ACP safe-kind inference is stricter to avoid accidental auto-approval due to substring matches (still auto-approves only confidentread/search).
Mitigations / deployment guidance
- Keep the Gateway loopback-only unless you have a strong reason not to:
gateway.bind="loopback"/openclaw gateway run --bind loopback. - Avoid exposing the Gateway directly to the public internet. Use an SSH tunnel or Tailscale to access a loopback-bound Gateway.
- Treat opting in to default-denied HTTP tools (via
gateway.tools.allow) as high-risk and audit such configurations carefully.
Credits
OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting this issue and contributing remediation work.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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