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GHSA-89vp-x53w-74fx
No affected components available
Summary
Prior to version 1.4.0, the rmcp crate's Streamable HTTP server transport (crates/rmcp/src/transport/streamable_http_server/) did not validate the incoming Host header. This allowed a malicious public website, via a DNS rebinding attack, to send authenticated requests to an MCP server running on the victim's loopback or private-network interface — violating the MCP specification's transport security guidance.
Impact
An attacker who convinces a victim to visit a malicious page can:
- Enumerate and invoke any tool exposed by a locally-running rmcp-based MCP server.
- Read resources, prompts, and any state accessible via the MCP session.
- Trigger side effects (file writes, shell execution, API calls, etc.) limited only by what tools the victim's server exposes.
Because MCP servers frequently run with the user's privileges and expose developer tooling (filesystems, shells, browser control, language servers, etc.), the practical impact can extend to arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine.
Affected Versions
rmcp < 1.4.0 — all prior releases of the Streamable HTTP server transport. Non-HTTP transports (stdio, child-process) are not affected.
Patched Versions
rmcp >= 1.4.0 (current: 1.5.1).
Patch
Fixed in PR #764 (commit 8e22aa2), released as v1.4.0 on 2026-04-09:
StreamableHttpServerConfig::allowed_hostsnow defaults to a loopback-only allowlist:["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"].- All incoming HTTP requests pass through
validate_dns_rebinding_headers(), which parses theHostheader and returns HTTP 403 if the host is not on the allowlist. - Public deployments can configure an explicit allowlist via
StreamableHttpService::with_allowed_hosts(...), or opt out (not recommended without an upstream reverse proxy that validatesHost) viadisable_allowed_hosts().
This fix validates the Host header only. Origin header validation is tracked as a defense-in-depth follow-up in #822 and is not required to block the DNS rebinding attack described here — the browser cannot forge the Host header sent to the rebound server.
Workarounds for Unpatched Users
- Upgrade to
rmcp >= 1.4.0. - If upgrade is not possible, place the MCP server behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy) configured to reject requests whose
Hostheader is not one of your expected hostnames. - Do not bind the MCP server to
0.0.0.0without such a proxy.
Resources
- PR: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/764
- Issue: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/815
- Follow-up (Origin validation): https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/822
- MCP transport security guidance: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#security-warning
Related advisories (same class of vulnerability)
- TypeScript SDK: GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w
- Python SDK: GHSA-9h52-p55h-vw2f
- Go SDK: GHSA-xw59-hvm2-8pj6
- Java SDK: GHSA-8jxr-pr72-r468
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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