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GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq
Summary
CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (praisonai deploy --type api) get a server that:
- binds to
0.0.0.0per the recommended sample YAML - exposes
/chatand/agentsendpoints - runs
praisonai.run()on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment - does not require any authentication
The PyPI wheel praisonai==4.6.33 (current @latest) still ships the generator with auth_enabled defaulting to False. The fix shape is opt-in via APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...).
Details
Anchor (file:line:symbol)
- Vulnerable artifact:
praisonai==4.6.33on PyPI. - Defaults:
praisonai/deploy/models.py:29—auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, ...);praisonai/deploy/models.py:30—auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, ...). - Generator:
praisonai/deploy/api.py:40—AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled};api.py:41—AUTH_TOKEN = {repr(config.auth_token)};api.py:43-49—def check_auth(): if not AUTH_ENABLED: return True. - CLI entry: documented as
praisonai deploy --type api(vendor README); produces the generator output above with no flag required to suppress the warning, because no warning is emitted.
Vulnerable code (verbatim from installed wheel)
# praisonai/deploy/models.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
class APIConfig(BaseModel):
host: str = Field(default="127.0.0.1", description="Server host")
port: int = Field(default=8005, description="Server port")
cors_enabled: bool = Field(default=True, description="Enable CORS")
auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, description="Enable authentication") # line 29
auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Authentication token") # line 30
# praisonai/deploy/api.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
code = f\'\'\'...
# Authentication
AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled} # False by default
AUTH_TOKEN = {repr(config.auth_token)} # None by default
def check_auth():
if not AUTH_ENABLED:
return True # short-circuit, accept all
token = request.headers.get(\'Authorization\', \'\').replace(\'Bearer \', \'\')
return token == AUTH_TOKEN
...
\'\'\'
A default invocation of the deploy command emits a server whose check_auth() short-circuits to True and accepts unauthenticated /chat, /agents POSTs.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI 4.6.33 generates Flask API server with auth
disabled by default. Class H sibling of CVE-2026-44338.
Phase 1: reflect on praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig defaults.
Phase 2: call generate_api_server_code(default config) and assert the
emitted source contains AUTH_ENABLED = False and the
short-circuit return.
Phase 3: re-run with auth_enabled=True, auth_token='s3cret-bearer-value'
and confirm the emitted source flips to the secure shape.
Exit code 0 = PASS = vulnerable defaults confirmed.
"""
import sys, traceback
def phase1_dataclass_defaults():
print("PHASE 1 - praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig default values")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
cfg = APIConfig()
checks = [
("auth_enabled", cfg.auth_enabled, False),
("auth_token", cfg.auth_token, None),
]
for name, observed, expected in checks:
ok = observed == expected
mark = "VULNERABLE" if name in ("auth_enabled","auth_token") and ok else "ok"
print(f" {name:14s} = {observed!r:18s} (expected {expected!r}) [{mark}]")
assert ok
print(" >> APIConfig defaults reproduce the CVE-2026-44338 shape.")
def phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth():
print("PHASE 2 - generate_api_server_code(default config) emits unauth server")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=APIConfig())
for needle in ["AUTH_ENABLED = False","AUTH_TOKEN = None","if not AUTH_ENABLED:","return True"]:
assert needle in src, f"missing: {needle!r}"
print(f" [FOUND] {needle!r}")
print(" >> Default-config generator emits Flask server with check_auth() short-circuit.")
def phase3_fix_shape_available():
print("PHASE 3 - auth_enabled=True flips to secure shape")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
cfg = APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token="s3cret-bearer-value")
src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=cfg)
assert "AUTH_ENABLED = True" in src
assert "AUTH_ENABLED = False" not in src
print(" >> Fix shape works when toggled. Class H confirmed: default is insecure.")
def main():
print("=" * 64)
print("legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI default-config AUTH_ENABLED=False")
print("=" * 64)
try:
phase1_dataclass_defaults()
phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth()
phase3_fix_shape_available()
except Exception:
traceback.print_exc()
print("FAIL"); sys.exit(2)
print("PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0.")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
PoC dependencies: praisonai==4.6.33 from PyPI. Tested on Python 3.11.
Run log verdict: PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0. — vulnerable-default shape confirmed. auth_enabled=False by default, check_auth() short-circuits to True, fix toggle exists but is opt-in.
Impact
An operator who runs the vendor-documented quickstart (pip install praisonai && praisonai deploy --type api) gets a network-reachable Flask server that invokes praisonai.run() on attacker-supplied JSON with the user's LLM API keys in the process environment. The attacker reaches arbitrary LLM-orchestration (including any tool-use the agents define, which in PraisonAI commonly includes python_repl, bash, file I/O, and HTTP calls), with the host's API-key credit billed to the operator.
- Belief: CVE-2026-44338 was filed and triaged.
- Reality:
praisonai==4.6.33is current@lateston PyPI (2026-05-16). The generator still defaults toauth_enabled=False. - Gap: The CVE acknowledges the fix shape exists. The fix is opt-in. The default-config consumer remains vulnerable.
Parent CVE: CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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