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GHSA-83vm-p52w-f9pw

MediumCVSS 6.5 / 10
Published May 6, 2026·Last modified May 9, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

The extract_hidden_states speculative decoding proposer in vLLM returns a tensor with an incorrect shape after the first decode step, causing a RuntimeError that crashes the EngineCore process. The crash is triggered when any request in the batch uses sampling penalty parameters (repetition_penalty, frequency_penalty, or presence_penalty).

A single request with a penalty parameter (e.g., "repetition_penalty": 1.1) is sufficient to crash the server. The crash is deterministic and immediate — no concurrency, race condition, or special workload is required.

Details

In vLLM v0.17.0, the extract_hidden_states proposer's propose() method returned sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), producing a tensor of shape (batch_size, 1).

In PR #37013 (first released in v0.18.0), the KV connector interface was refactored out of propose(). The return type changed from tuple[Tensor, KVConnectorOutput | None] to Tensor, and the .unsqueeze(-1) call was removed along with the KV connector output:

# Before (v0.17.0):
return sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), kv_connector_output  # shape (batch_size, 1)

# After (v0.18.0+):
return sampled_token_ids  # shape (batch_size, 2) after first decode step

The refactor missed that sampled_token_ids changed semantics between the first and subsequent decode steps. After the first decode step, the rejection sampler allocates its output as (batch_size, max_spec_len + 1). With num_speculative_tokens=1, this produces shape (batch_size, 2) instead of the expected (batch_size, 1), causing a broadcast shape mismatch during penalty application.

Impact

Any vLLM deployment between v0.18.0 and v0.19.1 (inclusive) configured with extract_hidden_states speculative decoding is affected. A single API request containing any penalty parameter immediately and permanently crashes the EngineCore process, resulting in complete loss of service availability.

Patches

Fixed in PR #38610, first included in vLLM v0.20.0. The fix slices the return value to sampled_token_ids[:, :1], ensuring the correct (batch_size, 1) shape regardless of the rejection sampler's output dimensions.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to vLLM v0.20.0 or later.
  • If upgrading is not possible, avoid using extract_hidden_states as the speculative decoding method on affected versions.
  • Alternatively, reject or strip penalty parameters (repetition_penalty, frequency_penalty, presence_penalty) from incoming requests at an API gateway before they reach vLLM.
Risk Scores
Base Score
6.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.0

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Related Vulnerabilities
  • CVE-2026-44223
    Alias
  • EUVD-2026-29800
    Alias

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