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GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x

CriticalCVSS 9.1 / 10
Published Apr 15, 2026·Last modified May 5, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Go logogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
7.5.0 – 7.15.2
Description

Impact

A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.

Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:

  • OAuth2 Proxy is configured with --reverse-proxy
  • and at least one rule is defined with --skip_auth_routes or the legacy --skip-auth-regex

OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.

This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.

Patches

This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.

Mitigation

  • Strip any client-provided X-Forwarded-Uri header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level

  • Explicitly overwrite X-Forwarded-Uri with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy

    Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:

      location /internal-auth/ {
    internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path

    # Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
    proxy_set_header Host       $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
    # set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;

    proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
  }

  • Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy

  • Remove or narrow --skip-auth-route / --skip-auth-regex rules where possible

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Risk Scores
Base Score
9.1

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
8.3

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.73%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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