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GHSA-7c4v-fwgw-9rf7

MediumCVSS 5.3 / 10
Published Aug 7, 2026·Last modified Aug 7, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Impact

When a Nuxt dev server is bound to a network-reachable interface (for example nuxt dev --host for on-device testing), the default-enabled Chrome DevTools workspace endpoint GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json returns the absolute project root (workspace.root, i.e. rootDir) and a persistent per-project workspace UUID.

GHSA-rq7w-g337-39qq added a gate (isLocalDevRequest) intended to restrict this endpoint to local requests, but that gate is header-based: it trusts request metadata rather than the connected peer address. A request with no Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, and Referer headers (normal for a non-browser client such as curl) is treated as local, and the Host allow-list is compared against the attacker-supplied Host header. As a result, any unauthenticated host that can reach the dev server on the LAN can retrieve the project's absolute filesystem path and workspace UUID, for example with curl -H 'Host: localhost' http://<dev-host-lan-ip>:3000/.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json.

This is information disclosure only: there is no file read, file write, or code execution reachable from the endpoint. It requires the dev server to be reachable beyond loopback and experimental.chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings to be enabled (it defaults to true). Production builds are unaffected, because the endpoint is registered only as a development handler.

Patches

Fixed in nuxt@4.5.1 and nuxt@3.21.10. The endpoint now additionally requires the connected TCP peer to be a loopback address, verified from the socket rather than from request headers, so a non-loopback LAN client is rejected regardless of the Host, Origin, Referer, or Sec-Fetch-* headers it sends. The shared header-based check is left unchanged, so the CSRF / same-origin behaviour that other dev handlers rely on is preserved. After this fix, Chrome DevTools workspace auto-mapping only works when the browser reaches the dev server over loopback (localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1), which matches the feature's intent (the browser and dev server sharing a filesystem).

Workarounds

  • Do not bind the dev server to a non-loopback interface on an untrusted network, or restrict access to the dev port with a firewall.
  • Disable the feature by setting experimental.chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings: false in nuxt.config.
Risk Scores
Base Score
5.3

The vulnerability can be exploited over a local network, such as Wi-Fi. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
1.3

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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Medium severity
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