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GHSA-7853-gqqm-vcwx

Published Apr 8, 2026·Last modified Apr 8, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Affected

openclaw-claude-bridge v1.1.0

Issue

v1.1.0 spawns the Claude Code CLI subprocess with --allowed-tools "" and the release notes + README claim this "disables all CLI tools" for sandboxing. This claim is incorrect.

Per the Claude Code CLI documentation, --allowed-tools (alias --allowedTools) is an auto-approve allowlist of tools that execute without permission prompts — NOT a restriction on which tools are available. The correct flag to restrict the available tool set is --tools:

--tools <tools...> Specify the list of available tools from the built-in set. Use "" to disable all tools, "default" to use all tools, or specify tool names (e.g. "Bash,Edit,Read").

Impact

  • All CLI tools (Read/Write/Bash/WebFetch/...) remain nominally available to the spawned subprocess.
  • Actual execution behavior in --print non-interactive mode depends on undocumented CLI defaults (may auto-deny, may error out, may hang).
  • Users who deploy the bridge behind any interface that forwards untrusted prompts (e.g., publicly exposed OpenClaw gateway, automated pipelines with web-fetched context, agents that consume tool results from other systems) may be relying on a sandbox that does not exist.

The README explicitly makes a security claim the code does not uphold, creating a false sense of safety for downstream operators. If the underlying CLI behavior changes in a future version to auto-allow tools in --print mode, prompt-injection attacks could trigger arbitrary Read/Write/Bash operations in the gateway's process context.

Patches

Fixed in v1.1.1 (commit 8a296f5) by switching to --tools "". The environment variable was also renamed from CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS to CLAUDE_TOOLS to match the flag.

Workarounds

Setting CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS on v1.1.0 has no mitigating effect. Upgrade to v1.1.1 or manually edit dist/cli-bridge.js to replace --allowed-tools with --tools.

References

  • Fix: https://github.com/SeaL773/openclaw-claude-bridge/commit/8a296f5
  • v1.1.1 notes: https://github.com/SeaL773/openclaw-claude-bridge/releases/tag/v1.1.1
  • Claude Code CLI reference: https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference

Credit

Found during a second-round code review.

Risk Scores
Base Score
0.0

Measures severity based on intrinsic characteristics of the vulnerability, independent of environment.

Threat Intelligence
0.0

No exploitation activity has been observed at this time. Continue routine monitoring.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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