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GHSA-6wvx-3r32-xmcg
Summary
The forge.http client stored cookies from Set-Cookie response headers in a plain object keyed by cookie name and path. A malicious server could use the cookie name __proto__ to add properties to Object.prototype, use inherited names such as constructor to add properties to Object, and send an empty cookie value to delete Object.prototype properties. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.
Details
client.setCookie() in lib/http.js stored a cookie with client.cookies[cookie.name][cookie.path] = cookie, creating client.cookies[cookie.name] only when !(cookie.name in client.cookies). Both values come from the server's Set-Cookie header via response.getCookies(). Because in also sees inherited properties:
- a cookie named
__proto__skipped the initialization,client.cookies['__proto__']returnedObject.prototype, and the cookie path was written as a newObject.prototypeproperty, visible on every object; - a cookie named
constructorwrote onto the globalObjectfunction the same way; - a cookie with an empty value calls
client.removeCookie(name, path), which used the sameinchecks and thendelete client.cookies[name][path], soSet-Cookie: __proto__=; path=toStringdeletedObject.prototype.toString. This path skipped the cookie's secure-flag and domain checks, so it also worked forhttp://clients.
forge.http is not loaded by require('node-forge'). It is included in the forge.all browser bundle and is used with a socket pool, for example by forge.xhr.
The fix uses own-property checks for the cookie store and ignores cookies named __proto__ or with the path __proto__.
Patches
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Cookies from a server can no longer add or remove properties of Object.prototype or Object.
Workarounds
Don't use forge.http or forge.xhr with servers that aren't trusted, or filter Set-Cookie headers named __proto__, constructor or other Object.prototype property names before they reach the client.
Credits
Reported by @arunmozhivarman-dtx and @Dremig.
Proof of concept
A server response for a forge.http client (http.createClient({url: 'https://...', socketPool: ...})) containing:
Set-Cookie: __proto__=evil; path=polluted
On 1.4.0, after the client processes the response, ({}).polluted is the cookie object. With Set-Cookie: __proto__=; path=toLocaleString, Object.prototype.toLocaleString is deleted (for http:// and https:// clients). On 1.4.1 these cookies are ignored and Object.prototype is unchanged.
Regression tests are in tests/security/ghsa-6wvx-3r32-xmcg.js.
Impact
Applications that use the forge.http client (directly, or through forge.xhr in the forge.all browser bundle) against a server that can be malicious are affected. The server can add properties to Object.prototype and Object for the whole JavaScript realm, which can change application logic that reads properties from plain objects, and can delete built-in Object.prototype methods, breaking the page or process. Applications that don't use forge.http are not affected.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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