Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-6mv3-wm7j-h4w5
No affected components available
Impact
The filesystem glob pattern wildcards *, ?, and [...] match file path literals and leading dots by default, which unintentionally exposes sub folder content of allowed paths.
Example: The fs scope $HOME/*.key would also allow $HOME/.ssh/secret.key to be read even though it is in a sub directory of $HOME and is inside a hidden folder.
Scopes without the wildcards are not affected. As ** allows for sub directories the behavior there is also as expected.
Patches
The issue has been patched in the latest release and was backported into the currently supported 1.x branches.
Workarounds
No workaround is known at the time of publication.
References
The original report contained information that the dialog.open component automatically allows one sub directory to be read, regardless of the recursive option.
Imagine a file system looking like
o ../
o documents/
- file.txt
- deeper/
o deep_file.txt
Reproduction steps:
- Trying to load “file.txt” or “deep_file.txt” doesn’t work. Expected
- Select “documents” as folder to open(ie. with window.TAURI.dialog.open)
- Trying to load “file.txt” works. Expected
- Trying to load “deep_file.txt” also works, which isn’t expected
The recursive flag is used in https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/blob/cd8c074ae6592303d3f6844a4fb6d262eae913b2/core/tauri/src/scope/fs.rs#L154 to scope the filesystem access to either files in the folder or to also include sub directories.
The original issue was replicated and further investigated.
The root cause was triaged to the glob crate facilitating defaults, which allow the * and [...] to also match path literals.
MatchOptions {
case_sensitive: true,
require_literal_separator: false,
require_literal_leading_dot: false
}
This implicated that not only the dialog.open component was affected but rather all fs scopes containing the * or [...] glob.
During this investigation it became obvious that the current glob matches would also match hidden folder (e.g: .ssh) content by default, without explicitly allowing hidden folders to be matched. This is not commonly expected behavior in comparison to for example bash.
The new default Match options are:
MatchOptions {
case_sensitive: true,
require_literal_separator: true,
require_literal_leading_dot: true
}
Another note security relevant for developers building applications interacting with case sensitive filesystems is, that the
case_sensitiveoption only affects ASCII file paths and is not valid in Unicode based paths. This is considered a known risk until theglobcrate supports non-ASCII file paths for this type of case sensitive matching.
For more Information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Open an issue in tauri Email us at security@tauri.app
The vulnerability can be exploited over a local network, such as Wi-Fi. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard