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GHSA-69xr-m8h6-h664
No affected components available
Description
A vulnerability exists in the X-Forwarded-Prefix header processing logic within Angular SSR. The internal validation mechanism fails to properly account for URL-encoded characters, specifically dots (%2e%2e). This allows an attacker to bypass security filters by injecting encoded path traversal sequences that are later decoded and utilized by the application logic.
When an Angular SSR application is configured to trust proxy headers and is deployed behind a proxy that forwards the X-Forwarded-Prefix header without prior sanitization, an attacker can provide a payload such as /%2e%2e/evil.
The vulnerability manifests in two ways:
- Open Redirect: The application processes a redirect (e.g., router
redirectTo). The decoded traversal payload manipulates the Location header, forcing the browser to an unintended path or external domain. - Server-Side Request Steering: The manipulated prefix is used as the base path for server-side
HttpClientrequests. This causes the server to make requests to unintended internal paths or external endpoints.
Attack Preconditions
- The application must use Angular SSR.
- The application must perform internal redirects or use relative URLs in server-side
HttpClientrequests. - The upstream infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the
X-Forwarded-Prefixheader to the SSR process without stripping or sanitizing it.
Workarounds
Until the patch is applied, developers should manually sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts. The workaround involves decoding the component to catch encoded traversal attempts before normalization:
app.use((req, res, next) => {
let prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
if (Array.isArray(prefix)) prefix = prefix[0];
if (prefix) {
try {
// Decode the prefix to catch encoded characters like %2e (dots)
const decodedPrefix = decodeURIComponent(prefix);
// Sanitize: remove traversal attempts and ensure a safe leading slash
req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = decodedPrefix
.replace(/\.\./g, '') // Remove any dot-dot sequences
.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/'); // Ensure it starts with exactly one slash
} catch (e) {
// If decoding fails, remove the potentially malicious header entirely
delete req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
}
}
next();
});
Configuring Trusted Proxy Headers
By default, Angular ignores all X-Forwarded-* headers. If your application is behind a trusted reverse proxy (like a load balancer) that sets these headers, you can configure Angular to trust them. You can configure trustProxyHeaders when initializing the application engine:
const appEngine = new AngularAppEngine({
// Trust specific headers
trustProxyHeaders: ['x-forwarded-host', 'x-forwarded-proto', 'x-forwarded-prefix'],
});
const nodeAppEngine = new AngularNodeAppEngine({
// Trust all X-Forwarded-* headers
trustProxyHeaders: true,
});
Patches
- 22.0.0-next.7
- 21.2.9
- 20.3.25
- 19.2.25
Resources
- https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/33031
- https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#configuring-trusted-proxy-headers
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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