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GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vc
No affected components available
Summary
Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses.
Details
In io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds.
According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6
Care must be taken to only accept
data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the
QNAME or a parent of the QNAME.
One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is
part of the domain for which the query was intended.
Impact
DNS Cache Poisoning (Bailiwick Bypass). Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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