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GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh
No affected components available
The HTTP /rpc sessions method returned every attached session UUID without authentication, and the /rpc handler accepted an arbitrary session field with no ownership check. An anonymous caller could enumerate UUIDs and impersonate any authenticated session.
"Attached" means sessions registered via {"method":"attach"} — the only writer to the HTTP session map. Ordinary stateless /rpc requests use ephemeral per-request sessions that are filtered from sessions() and destroyed at end-of-request, so they are not enumerable.
Exposure
- Exposed: clients that issue
attach, notably the official Rust SDK'sHttp/Httpsengine (auto-attaches once perSurrealhandle). - Not exposed: REST endpoints (
/sql,/key,/signin,/export, etc.); WebSocket/rpc(per-connection scope,attachrefused); embedded / MCP usage; ad-hocPOST /rpccallers that neverattach.
Impact
For each attached and authenticated session, an unauthenticated attacker can read, write, and delete any data the session can reach, dump metadata, invalidate sessions, and escalate to that session's privilege level (up to root). An attached session that has not yet authenticated is Level::No and confers no privilege.
Patches
- HTTP
sessions()now returnsmethod_not_allowed. WebSocket retains per-connection enumeration. - The HTTP
/rpchandler gates client-supplied session IDs against the caller's request-level auth principal (actor id + level); mismatches returnsession_not_found. - Attached HTTP sessions are capped via
SURREAL_HTTP_MAX_ATTACHED_SESSIONS.
Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
No configuration-level mitigation fully addresses this. For Users unable to upgrade:
- Avoid SDKs and client flows that call
attachagainst HTTP/rpc(notably the Rust SDK'sHttp/Httpsengine). Prefer the WebSocket transport, or REST endpoints (/sql,/signin,/key,/export) which never populate the attached-session map. - Restrict
/rpcto trusted clients at the network layer.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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