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GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh
No affected components available
Summary
UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view.
Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): the gap is NOT a per-field inner @JsonView (the unwrapped sub-object's own BeanDeserializer gates inner fields correctly). The unchecked gate is the view of the unwrapped CONTAINER property.
Intent proof (runtime, 2.x HEAD 21dd70dd and 3.x HEAD 7a5939d6)
An @JsonView(AdminView) property that is NOT @JsonUnwrapped → null under PublicView (correctly gated). The identical property WITH @JsonUnwrapped → fully populated (bypass). The fix the creator path already received, not applied to the regular-property method.
Impact — write-side mass-assignment / privilege escalation
@JsonView is commonly used as a write-side authorization guard: a public endpoint binds the body under readerWithView(PublicView.class) and groups privileged state in a nested object whose container property is @JsonView(AdminView). When that property is @JsonUnwrapped, an untrusted caller mass-assigns it. PoC: a self-service registration where AccountFlags{role,approved,creditBalance} is @JsonView(AdminView) @JsonUnwrapped; attacker JSON {role:ADMIN,approved:true,creditBalance:1000000} under PublicView binds all three → approved admin with arbitrary balance. The failing gate is a WRITE gate, hence integrity-high (C:N/I:H/A:N); no worse than the C:L/I:L parent and arguably higher as @JsonView-as-write-guard is the exact use case #5971/#5969 defended.
Affected
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind2.x: confirmed bypass at 21dd70dd (== released 2.21.4 / 2.22.0 line; includes the #5973 backport).DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSIONdefault=true.tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind3.x: confirmed bypass at HEAD 7a5939d6 (latest 3.x).DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSIONdefault=false → the stock-config repro is the common shape where privileged inner fields are individually@JsonView(PublicView)and the developer relies on the container@JsonView(AdminView); the 3.x PoC mass-assigns role/approved/creditBalance under PublicView. (The other simultaneous report's PoC was reportedly fixed on 3.x; this distinct container-property path is not.)
Additive variants (runtime-confirmed both branches; all closed by the same one-line guard)
- nested
@JsonUnwrapped(unwrapped-in-unwrapped) — recursive bypass. - merge /
readerWithView(...).withValueToUpdate(...)(PATCH/partial-update) — bypass; non-unwrapped merge control gates correctly. - builder-based deserializer (
@JsonDeserialize(builder=...)) —BuilderBasedDeserializerroutes through the sameprocessUnwrapped. - Honest non-findings: read-side serialization correctly honors views (no leak);
@JsonAnySetter+view and@JsonTypeInfo+@JsonUnwrappedare separate/unsupported behaviors, not this bug.
Fix
Add prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) (when MapperFeature.DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION/active-view applies) to the processUnwrapped() property loop, mirroring processUnwrappedCreatorProperties(). One change closes the impact PoC + all three variants across BeanDeserializer and BuilderBasedDeserializer. Full runnable PoCs (2.x + 3.x) + variant harnesses available on request.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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