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GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx
github.com/openchoreo/openchoreogithub.com/openchoreo/openchoreoSummary
The OpenChoreo API server (openchoreo-api) authorized requests to its exec and wirelogs endpoints against the project supplied by the caller in the request, rather than against the project that actually owns the target component. The target component was resolved by name only, and the authorization engine decided purely from the caller-supplied resource hierarchy — the component's real owning project was never checked. As a result, an authenticated user who holds a project-scoped exec or log-viewing grant on any single project could run commands in, and read the wirelogs of, components owned by other projects in the same namespace.
Impact
An authenticated tenant holding a project-scoped component:exec grant on just one project can execute arbitrary commands — including an interactive shell — inside the running pods of components owned by any other project in the same namespace. This exposes those workloads' environment variables and mounted Secrets (such as database credentials, API keys, and tokens), allows tampering with the workload, and enables further pivoting using the workload's own network position and credentials. The same flaw in the wirelogs endpoint lets a project-scoped wirelogs:view grant read any component's wirelogs in the namespace.
The blast radius is every component in the namespace, reachable from a single legitimate project grant. The boundary crossed is project-within-namespace: the request still pins the namespace, so the issue does not cross namespace boundaries. In effect this is a cross-project (cross-team) remote command-execution and data-access primitive available to any low-privileged tenant.
Patches
Fixed in 1.2.3 and 1.1.6. The fix aligns the exec and wirelogs endpoints with the pattern already used by other first-class component operations: the target component is fetched first and authorization is evaluated against its real owning project (comp.Spec.Owner.ProjectName) instead of the caller-supplied project query parameter.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Restrict
component:execandwirelogs:viewgrants to trusted operators only. Any holder of such a grant on any project can reach every component in the same namespace. - Where stronger isolation is required, separate sensitive components into their own namespaces, since the flaw does not cross namespace boundaries.
Related advisories
GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327— the cluster-gateway internal proxy applies no caller authorization, so this API-layer authorization bypass reaches the data-plane Kubernetes API with no compensating control: https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/security/advisories/GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g— reported together as part of the same review.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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