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GHSA-4vp2-6q8c-pvq2
No affected components available
The Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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