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GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x

CriticalCVSS 9.4 / 10
Published Feb 17, 2026·Last modified Mar 13, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
  • Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

  1. Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
  2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

  1. Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
  2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
  3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

  • Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
  • Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
  • Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

  • f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Risk Scores
Base Score
9.4

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
8.6

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.65%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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