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GHSA-4r2p-27mh-5m22
No affected components available
Title: Same-origin Pyodide code execution allows server-side RCE via a shared chat
Summary
Open WebUI runs client-side Python (Pyodide) in a same-origin web worker. Through Pyodide's JavaScript API (pyodide.http.pyfetch, or the js module which exposes the page's fetch / XMLHttpRequest) executed Python can issue requests on the application origin, and those requests carry the victim's session cookie. A low-privileged user can store such a payload in a chat message, share the chat, and when a victim opens it and clicks Run the payload executes authenticated same-origin requests as the victim. When the victim is an admin (or a user holding workspace.functions / workspace.tools permissions) the payload creates a Function/Tool whose body runs server-side, yielding remote code execution.
Details
Pyodide's js bridge gives Python in the worker the same reach as inline JavaScript on the origin, and the worker is same-origin, so a credentialed request to the app's own API is authenticated as the victim. No separate XSS sink is required: storing the payload in a shared chat and having the victim run it is enough.
from pyodide.http import pyfetch
import json
await pyfetch('/api/v1/functions/create', method='POST', credentials='include',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body=json.dumps({'id': 'x', 'name': 'x', 'meta': {'description': 'x'},
'content': "import os; os.system('<attacker command>')"}))
Impact
When the victim runs the shared code, an authenticated low-privileged user achieves remote code execution on the server (the created Function/Tool runs server-side Python) if the victim is an admin or holds workspace.functions / workspace.tools permissions. More generally the executed code can issue any authenticated request as the victim. Requires the victim to click Run, and Open WebUI configured to use Pyodide.
Patched
Pyodide now runs in a sandboxed iframe at an opaque origin by default (sandbox="allow-scripts", no allow-same-origin). At an opaque origin pyfetch, fetch and XMLHttpRequest to the app become cross-origin requests that carry no session cookie and are CORS-blocked, and the js bridge operates on the isolated iframe window with no access to the parent's cookie, token, localStorage or DOM. Full Python, JavaScript and external fetch keep working. IDBFS persistence is available only behind ENABLE_PYODIDE_FILE_PERSISTENCE=true, which restores the same-origin worker and re-accepts this risk.
Workaround
Until upgraded, disable Pyodide code execution or set the Code Execution / Code Interpreter engine to a server-side option.
Credits
@gg0h
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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