Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p
No affected components available
Summary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard