Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
Impact
A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (praktor-wk-<workspace>, mounted at /workspace/agent), escaping the documented uploads/ directory.
The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (internal/telegram/bot.go, at both upload sites) and resolved with path.Join, which collapses ../ sequences. A filename like ../../../CLAUDE.md resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside uploads/.
Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside uploads/ lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. CLAUDE.md, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under /workspace/agent. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).
Reachability
By default the bot has no user allowlist (allow_from: [] means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.
Affected versions
Through v0.9.0 (and HEAD 3902d29).
Patched versions
v0.9.1, containing PR #228.
Workarounds
Restrict telegram.allow_from to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to v0.9.1 is the recommended fix.
Fix (defense in depth)
internal/telegram/bot.go: applypath.Base()to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and...internal/container/manager.go:WriteVolumeBytesnow rejects any path that escapes/volafterpath.Join, protecting future callers.
Credit
Reported privately by tonghuaroot, who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real container.Manager, and fix verification.
Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.
Drag and drop some file here, or click to select
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard