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GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw

MediumCVSS 5.9 / 10
Published Nov 9, 2026·Last modified Nov 9, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Packagist logofilegator/filegator
< 7.15.0
Description

Summary

POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.

This reproduces the cross-user batch-archive disclosure of GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 through a different route — it still works with the fix for that advisory (PR #597) applied — and additionally allows deleting the login rate-limit lockfile.

Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact, as before: the primitive is confined to the temporary directory, not the whole filesystem.

Details

  • backend/Controllers/UploadController.php:61 — $file_name = $request->input('resumableFilename', 'file') is not passed through the preg_replace('/[^0-9a-zA-Z_]/', '', ...) that line 66 applies to resumableIdentifier.
  • Line 88 builds $prefix namespaced by the sanitized username, but $file_name reaches the temporary storage at lines 118, 121 and 125 without that prefix.
  • Line 115 — if ($chunks_size >= $total_size) is entered whenever resumableTotalSize is 0.
  • Lines 116-119 — the assembly loop for ($i = 1; $i <= $total_chunks; ++$i) does not execute when resumableTotalChunks is 0, so nothing is written to $file_name.
  • Line 121 — readStream($file_name) therefore reads the pre-existing temporary file of that exact name.
  • Line 122 — its contents are stored into the requester's own home directory.
  • Line 125 — remove($file_name) deletes it.

Path traversal outside the temporary directory is prevented by Tmpfs::sanitizeFilename(), so the primitive is bounded to that directory — but every user's transient objects share it.

PoC

Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs. The attacker is a valid low-privileged user holding upload (a first-class permission in the admin UI, and present in the shipped users.json.blank admin set).

  1. Victim creates a batch archive via POST /batchdownload; the JSON response returns the archive id.
  2. Attacker sends one POST /upload with resumableFilename=<victim's id>, resumableTotalChunks=0, resumableTotalSize=0, resumableRelativePath=/, and any small valid file part.
  3. Response is {"data":"Stored"}. The victim's archive is now byte-identical in the attacker's home directory, retrievable through the ordinary GET /download. The victim's temporary archive has been deleted.

Verified end to end with a PHPUnit test against current master; the archive contents matched byte for byte. Test file available on request.

Impact

Missing authorization (CWE-862) on temporary storage objects.

  • Cross-user disclosure of any transient object whose name the attacker can learn or predict. This includes batch archives — so GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4's impact remains reachable even with its fix applied — and the plaintext per-file copies that ZipArchiver::addFileFromStorage() writes while an archive is being built (those still use uniqid(), which is timestamp-derived).
  • Arbitrary delete within the temporary directory. AuthController::login() stores the login rate-limit counter as md5($ip).'.lock' in that same directory (backend/Controllers/AuthController.php:36, checked at line 44, written at line 58). An attacker can compute their own lockfile name and delete it, defeating the lockout.
  • Arbitrary append: with resumableTotalChunks >= 1, line 118 write($file_name, ..., true) appends attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary existing temporary file.

Remediation

Do not use the request-supplied filename as a storage key. Namespace the assembly file per user — for example reuse the existing $prefix — and carry the display filename separately for the storage->store() call.

Note that simply applying the [^0-9a-zA-Z_] filter to resumableFilename would corrupt legitimate uploads (sample.txt becomes sampletxt), because $final['filename'] is what becomes the stored name. The fix needs the namespacing, not just the filter.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
5.9

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
5.4

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.17%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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